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Abstract 
The kinematic consequences of special relativity can be expressed in 
three-dimensional language. Remarkably, this does not mean that, for 
making special relativity operational, positing a three-dimensional 
ontology is as good as positing the four-dimensional ontology. This is a 
singular limitation, whose nature is worth close inspection. In exploring 
it not just within a traditional, kinematic or geometric perspective but in 
its modern scientific context – i.e. as regards (1) causation, (2) localized 
observers that physics finds in nature and are not mere short forms for 
reference frames, and (3) the semiosis they develop and use to make 
reference to distant present objects – this essay pursues two aims. First, 
to put on view that the block universe outlook, regarding the 
macroscopic-scale universe as a timelessly existing four-dimensional 
world each of whose diverse items is composed of temporal parts, 
despite its being ontologically incorrect is indeed the only one that is 
consistent with special relativity, whose calculations are correct. This is 
tantamount to point out that the special relativity's descriptions of the 
macrouniverse necessitate to portray time as a dimension, and 
moreover as an uncollapsed one; i.e., as a compass wherein mobility, in 
the vein of the translocative motion that may occur on every spatial 
dimension, ought to be at least conceivable. Second, to probe 
arguments defending that special relativity alone can resolve the debate 
on whether the extramental macroworld is three-dimensional or four-
dimensional. In particular, since relativity's condition of possibility, 
namely the imposition on relativistic observers of describing at once 
past, present, and future states along the length of the observed moving 
entities, has been considered a proof that past and future components 
of real entities enjoy an unremitting mode of existence, the main 
argument probed in this paper is the one claiming that "if the world 
were three-dimensional, the kinematic consequences of special relativity 
and more importantly the experiments confirming them would be 
impossible." This is acknowledged as exact but it is remarked that, such 
imposition being a Kantian condition of possibility, it cannot reveal 
anything about what Kant called noumenon, i.e. extramentality. 
Electroneurobio log ía  vol. 13 (3), pp. 181-237, 2005 
 
The present essay originated as scholia to Ref. 1 (Petkov; see "Acknowledgements"), whose 
structure it thus closely follows. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Struggling against time. Explicit or implicit presentism, the view that 
only the present (the three-dimensional world at the instant 'now') exists, is the 
standard view on reality. Some research in history of ideas [2; 3, pp. 567-823, 
963-4] concluded that presentism is generally disowned only in some human 
groups where inner coercition is specially important and thus appreciated, such as 
very stratified social organizations instanced in rigorist settings as much diverse as 
certain pre-Columbian Mesoamerican cultures, the shoguns' Japan, and academic 
societies devoted to logic, mathematics, or theoretical physics. Those rigorisms go 
along with a societal need of looking for exemptions to waiting [e.g., for getting 
commands done, or for measuring frequency: 3, p. 312] and of denying reality to 
the irreversibility of time elapsing, whence efficient extramental causation becomes 
denied and imaginarily substituted by relations among subjective, mental contents; 
these contents, when generalized, are often understood as Platonic Ideas, 
connected not by way of efficient causality but by their inner buildups or 
idiosyncratic, essential 'virtues'. In the thus built reality, no 'present' state of affairs 
is privileged with the exclusive possession of powers to metamorphose itself into 
other states of affairs. Rather, it is claimed, every situated observer's experience 
crawls upward along its worldline collecting sensory information, but incorrectly 
interprets this information as meaning that only a constantly changing reality exists 
– whereas, in fact, past and future states are ontologically analogous to the present 
ones. 
1.2. Observation matters. Yet, which scientific observation would lend any 
support to rigorisms? Where on earth one could witness past and future affairs? A 
failure of simultaneity might be of use so long as, in becoming simultaneous, the 
entities leaving themselves to be known as arriving from other times retain a label 
revealing their formative epoch. Special relativity foresees that if a not-pointlike but 
extended entity is described by some eyewitness placed on an inertial frame of 
reference in relativistic motion, each distinguishable segment of the lengthy entity, 
consecutively positioned along the direction of relative motion, is to be described at 
a different present. So, as rigorisms wish, simultaneity seems to break down: some 
of those 'presents' did already occur (stay past) and others not yet occurred 
(remain future) in an inner or proper-time perspective taken by an observer located 
at rest in the very entity's middle segment; such a segment in the instant of the 
description is locatable, after some calculations on the signals' speed, the nearest 
to the relativistic eyewitness. This darting eyewitness, in turn, must remotely 
describe this mid segment of the extended entity (often visualized as a train of 
wagons, or as a rod pointing to the motion's direction) as it was in the past time 
which lags behind the outer eyewitness' present exactly by the shortest delay 
among all the signals coming from the segments of the lengthy entity – but 
nevertheless the entity's segments, which harbor events described as past and 
future in the inner, local, rest, or proper-time perspective taken from the middle 
segment, should also be described by the outer eyewitness as in the present 
scenario. In this way they are simultaneous for the outer, remote, relativistic 
eyewitness and sequential for the inner, local, resting observer. 
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Whence splitting the subuniverse and shifting the halves past another at 
relativistic speeds should suffice to grace with one's presence both bygone 
cosmogenesis and remotely impending cosmoclastics. This cannot help but make up 
an exciting prospect, whose academic entertainment depends on neglecting the 
same calculations for all the signals coming from the segments of the lengthy 
entity. The point is discussed below, though anyone seeking an exception to waiting 
might find explanative the outline in footnote1; key to give good reason for such 
sequences' simultaneizing is that, most remarkably, it only occurs inasmuch as the 
not-pointlike, extended entity shares in the direction of the frames' motion. The 
entity, though often pictured tilted at a certain angle, ougth to spread itself over a 
small piece of its path. 
But the issue at stake is far more interesting than estimating Doppler effects 
on the Pythagorean theorem for a space that keeps the signals' travel null from 
their own frame of reference while making that, from all the other inertial reference 
frames (only the local ones, in general relativity), such a null travel be seen to span 
some distances at speed c. The said neglect of the mentioned calculations depends 
on paying no heed to the very building of the developmentally-acquired 
hermeneutical ability to make sense of the physical semiosis involved in perceiving 
                                                 
1 This simultaneizing optical illusion comes from Pythagorean-theorem constraints on the distribution of 
light-speed signals that undergo Doppler distortion after their having been sequentially emitted at 
different segments of the lengthy entity. At the meeting instant, when the extended entity's middle 
segment is the one which stands the closest to the outer eyewitness, some past event at the entity's 
rear has been already signalized, some time before, by a photon emitted there. This photon has 
been traveling some distance while the outer eyewitness fled ahead of it in the same direction with a 
speed not very different from that of the photon. This redshifted first photon thus arrives to the 
relativistic eyewitness a bit after the meeting instant; namely, at the same instant that another, 
differently redshifted photon from the lengthy entity also arrives to the eyewitness, the second 
photon having been emitted from the entity's middle segment some time after the previous one. 
Still later in the frame of reference of the lengthy entity, a third photon has been emitted from the 
entity's front segment, but the latest photon traveled to encounter the relativistic eyewitness which 
was coming onto it from the opposite direction (or at a certain angle) so that the third photon 
arrives redshifted in another way or even blueshifted, yet – also – a bit after meeting time: too in 
the precise instant that the two previously emitted photons arrive. So the three photons become 
present (literally and physically) to cause local effects at the relativistic eyewitness in the same 
instant; i.e. they are genuinely simultaneous in the outer eyewitness' frame of reference, whereas 
they have been non-simultaneously emitted at different segments of the lengthy entity and, 
afterward since, they traveled at exactly the same speed, on different spacetime paths. The 
'transframing' stays smooth in both its backward and forward logs, the account being the same one 
that specifies for the so-called twin 'paradox' which brother is in fact younger at their re-encounter. 
Some summaries of the many detailed calculations are pointed out in the legend to Figure 6. Neither 
the twin 'paradox' appears nowadays paradoxical nor this simultaneizing achieves effects from non-
present physical causes. (Other simultaneizings, by altering the observer's time resolution, rather 
merge extramental sequences into molarly-acting situations, but this class of occurrences [6] is 
completely unrelated.) Paying no attention here to other obvious constraints, it might still behoove 
us to remark that this simultaneizing optical illusion, because reference frames cannot arrive to 
move one past another with any v ≥ c, stands restricted to such lenghts of the lenghty entity that 
can be accommodated by lightcones. Therefore, even if one is prepared to observe nothing (as 
neither the redshifted not the blueshifted photons could longer inform, e.g. transfer energy to, any 
other thing), one not either could split the ~ 1409 light-years wide subuniverse (its age is only ~149 
years, but if the speed of light indeed was not varying we seem bound to assume that for some 
period our subuniverse expanded, or space was being created, superluminally) and then grace with 
one's presence both its big bang and eventual big crunch by relativistically swifting the halves – 
because of the subuniverse's length is excessive thereto.  
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distant events. On certain historical reasons, introducing intellectual development 
into geometrical physics might appear irritating. Yet, since relativistic calculations 
relate to items in motion, a semiosis-installing distance from those events is 
indispensable in order to show that observers need not agree on which events are 
simultaneous. (For exhibiting this dependence on the state of motion of the 
observers, such observers ought to stand in relative motion, which must be 
translative; it precludes showing this relativity by analyzing the simultaneity of the 
not-spatially-distant mental contents in a single-observer, or – everything else  
unmodified – the perspectives of different observers occupying the same spacetime 
point one after another). Here it may be advanced that the mentioned 
developmental building of the ability to perceive distant events as distant involves 
frame-invariant causation – but this involvement is a matter of genetic 
epistemology, an academic department whose relationships with the one of 
relativity physics have much been overlooked, if at all minded. Still as a further, 
ultimate basis for mystification, the 'exciting prospect' rests on taking 'to be' as if it 
only were an intrinsic aptitude to properly accept combinable predications, rather 
than recognizing 'to be' as an unexpressible, non-conceptualizable enactment 
cancelling nonexistence; this slip-up, moreover, is one entrenched in social roots. A 
real stack of misinterpretations, truly. Deconstructing all of it, even sketchily, will 
take the remaining of this transdisciplinary article. Pending such a deconstruction, 
the imposition on relativistic observers of describing at once past, present, and 
future states along the length of the observed entities has been considered 
evidence that past and future components of real entities enjoy a unremitting mode 
of existence, authenticating the rigorist denial of presentism. 
1.3. Distinguishing subjective and extramental denotations. In utter contrast 
to such rigorisms, the presentist common-sense view reflects the way most people 
– and probably other primates and birds [4] as well as reptiles [5] – perceive the 
world. But in order to deal with world perceptions we need to clearly tell apart the 
two denotations of this term, 'world'; namely, its subjective and its extramental 
denotations, whose interval modules fairly differ. To this purpose, let us convene 
from this point on to reserve the term 'world' for indicating (save in quotations) 
'mental world', i.e. every set of mental contents into which a mind has become 
itself differentiated. We will use instead 'subuniverse', confessedly a graceless name 
whose valuable coinage is often attributed to J. A. Wheeler, or 'macroworld' when it 
matters to forget about the 'virtual' particles created from sub-indeterminacy 
fluctuations in energy, for denoting the observable nature where minds and time 
are found. Associated with these two terms let us form the pairs moment-world and 
instant-subuniverse, so as to apply here the convention deeming 
"physical instant … a very minute period considered the ultimate 
modulus of transformational change, namely the minimal interval over 
which a causal transformation is at all possible or might be marked off 
by two different instants, [while a moment is] the minimal 
transformational resolution or time acuity of minds, which is observed 
to stay in the order of one hundredth of a second. We do not live and 
remember physical instants; we live and remember moments, and the 
difference between an instant and a moment is a dilation that 
stretches physical instants an ascertainable number of times." [6] 
1.4. Features of presentisms. Presentism, taken (not to mix up the issues of 
dimensionality of the universe in relativity and in, say, Planck-scale models) as only 
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related to the macroscopic aspect of the subuniverse, when conceptually refined, 
features three defining tenets: 
1. The macroscopic subuniverse or actuality displays itself as a plurality of spatial 
localities (though, nevertheless, current presentisms may recognize that space 
is not a cosmologically fundamental but secondary occurrence). Space spreads 
forces over three dimensions; this essay will not discuss the dispersion of forces 
over extra dimensions collapsed into tiny magnitudes that might be necessary 
to unifiedly describe electromagnetic, gravitatory, and nuclear forces. Yet one 
might note that although presentist descriptions can accommodate non-local 
effects, e.g. quantum entanglements over macroscopic distances, in order to 
reveal relativity (also) in presentisms these forces' action carriers must be 
conceived as translocative: no action at a distance or non-local extramental 
effect is acceptable. Whence to produce relativistic descriptions presentists 
should grant that, in each of those spatial localities, the frame-invariant causal 
efficiency of therein-localized components locally generates changes one by 
one, and by recording such changes observers may reconstruct series of events 
successively occurring in worldines. 
2. Such a subuniverse or actuality thus exists only at the present instant and 
exhausts itself in its being present there in full entirety, so that all of the 
components of every macroscopic item cannot help but coexist at the same 
instant yet never on more than a single instant. Their coexistence enables them 
for affecting reciprocally through frame-invariant, efficient causal interactions 
which preclude that an event, which is now present, was future, and will be 
past, in addition modifies its being earlier than some and later than some of the 
other events. Yet, as mentioned in the next paragraph, this coexistence-
stemmed capability to efficiently deploy invariant relationships of precedence 
and succession remains unused in certain presentist scenarios which posit 
causation to be logical, rather than efficient. In any case, past and future 
components, items, events, or situations do not exist and as a result not either 
coexist and cannot causally interact. Specifically, no past or future situations, 
items, events, or components might be coexistent with the present ones which, 
rather, are able to frame-invariantly engage in causal interactions between 
themselves. In Indoeuropean-rooted languages past and future nonexistence 
might somehow more confoundingly be expressed with a double negation, 
saying that past and future 'are' in a certain way or certain 'mode of being', 
namely that they 'are' inactual – a supposed 'mode of being' oftentimes further 
split into two varieties, so that past states 'are' inactual and unmodifiable or 
blocked while, instead, future situations 'are' inactual and modifiable.  
3. This subuniverse or actuality is three-dimensional, meaning one of the following 
alternatives:  
3.1. A certain version of presentism, of pronounced Platonist affinities, 
pictures this subuniverse or actuality as sheerly three-dimensional. In 
this outlook the unchanging universe has no time-like thickness at all. It 
thus lacks and always lacked any intervalic extension of actuality which 
might count as a primary time dimension secondarily vanished as the 
magnitude of such a time dimension fully collapsed. As in this scenario 
no fourth dimension displays any span, the present instant's time-like 
duration is inherently zero; of course, it cannot be navigated. So in this 
 185
Electroneurobio log ía  vol. 13 (3), pp. 181-237, 2005 
 
special presentist outlook absolute uniform motion may exist but the 
universe or subuniverse houses no causal change; essential 'virtualities' 
stand for efficient causation, which – like any change it shapes – is held 
as pure appearance and sensory sham. Absence of frame-invariant 
efficient causation allows that an event, which appears now as present, 
appeared as future, and will appear past, in addition modifies its being 
earlier than some and later than some of the other events. It is unclear if 
inertia has to exist in it. 
3.2. A second, different version of presentism acknowledges a fourth 
dimension, although one whose span is fairly meagre. In this fourth-
dimensional version of presentism the changing situations whose 
sequential delays compose an interval do no exist simultaneously, but 
the subuniverse nevertheless also possesses a particular time-like 
thickness which – at least in our subuniverse – chances to be the same 
that also works for physical changes as their ultimate feasible interval 
unit. Thus the present instant's time-like extent is not zero. This 
intervalic inner extension of actuality (Fig. 2 below) counts as a time 
dimension whose span or magnitude collapsed down to the extent that, 
for every locality and segregated modality of interaction (or physical 
force field), its residual span accommodates no more, but not either less, 
than one action of physical causation at a time. Thus also in this version 
of presentism this fourth dimension is unnavigable and neither exception 
of waiting nor time travel may either occur, but its span is not nil [3] and 
all motion is a causal transformation moving with respect to timelike-thin 
space, i.e. it is relative. The action units of frame-invariant causation, by 
their matching the actuality's collapsed four-dimensional span, can 
efficiently run sequential transformations of the timelike-thin actuality 
precluding that any therein-enacted event modifies its being earlier than 
some and later than some of the other events. Other subuniverses' 
buildups might include this fourth dimension either less collapsed or, 
even, more collapsed, having varied its span with reference to 
fundamental requirements of physical action – with the result that in 
those subuniverses, whether by excess or by defect, causal sequences 
(of transformations in time) could not be sustained, whereas in our 
subuniverse, because of the specific magnitude of such residual span, 
change exists. 
1.5. How do we know that change is not illusory? Our perception of the 
external subuniverse reveals it as being indeed changing. The very causation of this 
change, however, remains for the most part unobserved: in 1905-1906 Ehrenfest 
and Einstein first realized that Planck's derivations work because physical change 
comes in integer multiples of hν and a little over fifty years later Crocco recognized 
that it entails the unobservability of physical causation itself. In other words, under 
observation the efficient causation of physical change behaves as if coming in 
microphysical packets which are discrete, i.e. which cannot help but annihilate 
themselves to effect the change. 
This discreteness, or whatever determines that behavior, has thus been 
pinpointed [2, 3, 6] as the reason why one does not observe the very causation of 
such a change (whether microphysical or macrophysical) but just the changes 
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done, except when the change is originated by one's own mental acts – as in the 
case of changes derived from the observer's voluntary behavior, such as the 
progress in one's writing or painting – and is observed on time scales large enough, 
i.e. through not too tight time windows (as commented below). This makes possible 
that, as ascertained on consistent observations (summarized, for example, in [7]) 
carried out over the last three-quarters of century and grounding the quite new 
academic field called genetic epistemology, whereas the very causation of outer 
changes remains for the most part unobserved, the concept of time and its three 
components – past, present, and future – are nevertheless inductively formed from 
what we directly perceive: namely, as a part of the individuals' intellectual 
development and interactive acquisition of epistemological adequacy to effectively 
operate in the surroundings. In those limiting circumstances, observers gain their 
metrical impression of duration from the time needed for their mental acts [cf. 8, p. 
633]. 
These modern results about the mechanisms of intellectual development, a 
development which each individual must work together with the surroundings, 
make clear that time not only elapses for mental accounts, but also outside of 
minds: viewing time as purely subjective is no longer tenable. Its untenabilty has 
become evinced, among other facts [3, pp. 81 (fn. 31) and 927], by the 
developmental acquisition of the animal minds' epistemological adequacy, whereby 
"Heraclitus says that the awake share a unique world, while the asleep turn 
themselves toward a private world" (Plutarch, De Superst. 3, 166 C). In order that, 
in contrast, time be purely subjective, such adequacy of the mental contents – on 
which rests the natural selection of suitable nervous systems' and cerebral 
architectures – should rather be achievable through bare contemplation, as an 
'infused knowledge' acquired just by contemplating the things' reciprocal relations, 
not interactively: as if an inborn-paralyzed child could be intellectually bred by 
exclusively watching television screens. The need, for humans and at least the 
other amniotes (i.e., the mentioned mammals as well as birds and other reptiles) to 
acquire befitting knowledge of extramental occurrences, of sequential interactivity2 
wherein the mind-originated probings enact absolute motion, entails that time, 
indeed, runs efficiently in extramental realm. 
1.6. Positing that 'everything' exists likewise in regard to time. This settled 
the issue of the existence of absolute motion in nature and allows to proceed on 
                                                 
2 
Brain electroactivity mediately [6] generates phosphenes which intonate the mind circumstanced 
therein. How to map the surrounds with them? By actively probing the environment, we found which 
phosphenes vary under our actions and which ones rather behave on their own. Through this 
discriminative process, empsyched organisms developmentally grow their intellectual acumen, 
adjusting mental contents to outer reality and developing an operational "concept" for every class of 
encountered things. These are then recognized, on new encounters, on their expected behavior in 
response to the operations one could do with it -- e.g., computers aren't eatable. Those operations 
which one avail (namely: can perform) form a system whose main feature is structural equilibrium - 
one can do some operation as well as the inverse one, so doing and undoing some changes. Others 
changes, nevertheless, resist; resistences reveal features internal of the things referred to through 
the phosphenes: what the "real things" can in their turn do. This equilibrium (mapping one's and 
foreign availabilities), structure (of operations), and genesis (developental) are the main features of 
intelligence. Both mind operations and mind reactions (mind-intonative phosphenes) are in the ontic 
consistency of mind; the brain's electroneurobiological structure is just one of the means to 
generate the latter ("sensations"). 
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topics which, as the one of simultaneity, logically come later. One should 
accordingly start by recognizing that extramental reality, namely how things fit 
together independently of the minds, changes in due course. And indeed, Heraclitus 
argued that the universe is perpetually changing, though he seems not to have 
explicitly discussed the connectionship of change and time. It was attributed to 
Heraclitus the opinion that everything flows (pánta rheí: this thereby-appalled Plato 
ascribed to Heraclitus in Cratylus 402 a; cf. Plato's Theaet. 152 d, 160 d), 
everything ceaselessly dances in choir (pánta chórei: this uplifted Aristotle ascribed 
to Heraclitus in Topikoí… 104 b 21 ss) [for a popular expose cf. also 9, p. 65]. Such 
a dependence making every macroscopic reality likewise contingent on time and 
determined by the temporal engagements of the flowing everything (pántoon … 
reóntoon, Plato's Cratylus 439 c) is contemporarily contested by scholars pointing 
that minds are xenochronic [2, 3, 6]. With this term, they assume that  
"natural science describes… realities of two kinds: observers, also 
called minds, which do not generate time inside them (but may 
emulate any outer course, an aptitude that may be called 
xenochronism), and the set of extramentalities, which does it (and 
interactively assists minds to emulate outer evolutions). While in 
minds memories persist because they do not exist within a coursing of 
time that could alter or erase them, extramentalities evolve because 
the transfers of causal efficiency make a microphysical time course 
which the inertial mass of some but not all elementary particles 
extends into sizeable scales" [10]. 
But this splitting, exposing that not everything of what natural science 
describes behaves identically as regards time, is quite recent. In ancient times, 
almost two centuries after Heraclitus, Aristotle effectively arrived at the conclusion 
that 'everything' exists likewise in regard to time. Positing this notable uniformity 
was not a option, as it was compulsory in order to found biology. He 
"… conceived knowing, gnoeín, as a variety of metabolic assimilation 
only for the purpose, and with the precise objective, of being able to 
compose a unique descriptive series with which to delineate the full 
variety of living beings – by comparing species among themselves and 
comparing the developmental sequences of individuals. With this 
conceptual tool, Aristotle was able to achieve his purpose, of attaining 
conceptual means suitable for unifiedly and uniformly describing the 
living beings found in nature in all their possible forms. His 
informational view of knowledge, presenting it as a variety of 
metabolic assimilation, is thus why Aristotle managed to institute 
biology as a unified science. … [I]n view of his mentioned purpose, it 
was uninteresting to detect if within the series of organisms animated 
by a vegetative-sensitive soul the individuals of some species included 
an existentiality circumstanced to sense and move its body. This is the 
case of a dog, for example. Other organisms lack such an 
existentiality in charge of biological functions, for example a starfish – 
or its common ancestors with the dog, if Aristotle could have minded 
of them. … These animals lack… any knowledge inasmuch as 
experience: in these animal species having an Aristotelian soul but not 
circumstancing an existentiality their 'knowledge' is mere information, 
gnoseologically uncharacterized – and only metaphorically called 
'knowledge' by external observers interested in keeping Aristotelian 
homogeneity for the biological series." [ibidem, Section 2]  
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1.7. Positing that 'everything' composes the only present 'now' that exists. 
Therefore, Aristotle's description would not embrace the mentioned heterogeneity 
(of xenochronic minds and time-generating macroworld) as his description could 
not distinguish between existentialities or subjectivities and bodily information. (As 
notorious, he was also unable to tell between a plurality of existentialities leaving 
aside the difference in their mental contents [3, chapter 1.6]). He was rather to 
deal unifiedly with all organisms, whether lacking existentiality or subjectivity or 
instead possessed with it, so setting a single continuous series of psychaí ('souls') 
just differing in informatical terms. Aristotle further arrived to the conclusion that 
such uniform 'everything' exists only at the moment 'now' since it is this moment 
that "connects past and future time" [11, p. 301] which themselves do not exist: 
"one part of [time] has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not 
yet" [11, p. 297]. 
Besides so portraying all realities in nature – as uniformly behaving with 
regard to time and composing in this way the only present 'now' that exists and in 
such presence exhausts itself altogether – Aristotle made another contribution to 
conceptually refining the presentist view, by asserting that nature is three-
dimensional: "A magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and 
if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three 
dimensions are all that there are" [12] (see also [13]). 
 
2. Physical and philosophical connections 
 
2.1. Instant 'thickness' and causation. The three defining features of 
presentism – asserting that the subuniverse is causally efficient to transform itself 
successively through local change (a feature turned macroscopic with the 
acquisition of inertial mass by only a fraction of elementary particles [3, 10]), exists 
only at the present instant exhausting itself completely in such a presence, and is 
three-dimensional or has its fourth dimension collapsed – are intrinsically linked: if 
the macroworld is three-dimensional it exists only at one instant of time and vice 
versa; the time-like thickness or 'duration' of the instant in such a changing 
macroworld is determined in relation to features of microscopically local causation. 
Namely, in the physical-causation-acknowledging variety of presentism this time-
like thickness of the instant admits neither causal sequences nor inchoations: it can 
let in neither more nor less than just one elementary process of energy transfer or 
efficient causation; that of course refers to what may be described as the very 
transfer of an action carrier of a force field, not to the response interval or lagging 
of its direct effects behind the causal action packet’s instantaneous absorption, i.e. 
the 'characteristic times' taken by the transitions caused [3, 6]. 
2.2. Denial of efficient causation affirms 'to be' as logical predicability and 
causal efficiency as pure outward show. Instead, in the physical-causation-denying, 
antichronic variety of presentism, for which transience is unbearable and on no 
account deemed basic, the instant's time-like thickness does not exist; 'to be' boils 
down to mere predication of attributes (explained below) rather than fundamental 
enactment; determinations come only from logical relationships, and physical 
change is sensory hallucination: in no way real transformation. As the therein-
revolting prospect that situations could really flow is altogether denied, reasonings 
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are supplied in order to repute illusive the irrevocability of time. Augustine of Hippo, 
still importanly influenced by Plato's antichronic outlook which instances such denial 
of reality to time elapsing, made an early move toward realizing that link by 
attempting to ascertain the duration of the 'now'. 
Augustine decided that the present moment cannot have any duration: "In 
fact the only time that can be called present is an instant... For if its duration were 
prolonged, it could be divided into past and future. When it is present it has no 
duration" [14, p. 119]. One should remark that, in order to avoid its being thus 
divided, there is no need that it completely lacks duration, as Augustine supposed, 
since enacting any division in extramental time demands causal efficiency, so that a 
time-like duration shorter than the time needed for enacting causal efficiency 
suffices to avert that "it could be divided into past and future" [3, pp. 309-312]. Yet 
Platonisms need to pronounce causal efficiency just sense deceit and pure outward 
show, reality being rather determined by the essential virtualities of timeless Ideas. 
2.3. Instant's duration and causal efficiency. One should remark, too, that 
this instant needlessly supposed of no duration, i.e. of no intervalic extension, is 
thus placed by Augustine into the same scenario that spatial extension. This 
combined move presents the universe as sheerly (and, literally, most narrowly) 
three-dimensional – otherwise, its time-like thickness makes a collapsed fourth 
dimension wherein only contingently may navigation become unworkable: the 
nature of such a fourth dimension's residual span is still alike to that of space – and 
sustains the antichronic outlook, i.e. Platonisms' denial of reality to irreversible 
time. 
But the topic is intricate, so that to visualize the ties between the three-
dimensionality of the subuniverse and its existence only at the instant 'now' 
imagine that 'the present moment' names some finite duration. For the sake of the 
argument let us forget time courses as determined by physical causation and, 
arbitrarily, let that duration be some fixed number of minutes. (For instance, 
Petkov [1] chooses ten seconds as his example). 
As these minutes are not further distinguishable into present, future, or past 
all of them are present. Thus every thing and the whole subuniverse would be given 
as a whole, or exist in its entirety both 'at once' and unchangeably, during all of the 
(rather, our clock's) instants composing the imaginarily protracted time-like 
thickness of the 'now'. Everything, even if instantaneous, would at least be likewise 
extended in time. For example, every mobile item would at once exist at all spatial 
points of a distance it travels for the fixed number of what we call minutes. 
Nevertheless, macroworld's items that are extended in time are four-dimensional, 
not three-dimensional. Presentists often remark that we seem to perceive a realm 
of items not appearing to exist at more than one instant. Whence not seldom it is 
thought [e.g., 1] that on the presentist view the fact that the subuniverse "is 
regarded as three-dimensional implies that the present moment must be" an 
instant with no inner transformative course that could be called duration or 'time 
taken by such a transformation'. This entails that in describing presentism one 
cannot forget (as we did, for the sake of exemplifying) time courses' being 
determined by physical causation, because the interval-like thickness of reality is to 
be linked with the minimal possible 'delay' that physical causation imposes in order 
to enact change [3, 6]. (Only so may a time-like thickness neither to 'hang' 
nature's transformations by turning causal courses into a 'legato', i.e. by enmeshing 
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the physical causation of change, nor to prevent causing transformations 
altogether.) 
2.4. Frame-invariance at the efficient causation's core. Whatever may count 
as physical causation is of course to be frame-invariant (i.e. no perspective could 
exist from which it vanishes or cancels) and to come about as every one of the 
reaction-producing modalities for exchanging energy in a certain energy range. As 
an interesting instance, when Crocco recognized that the fact that physical change 
comes in integer multiples of hν entails the outer unobservability of physical 
causation3 (which thus displays the extramental transformations as if they were 
constant conjunction or structural spectacle delineated by certain connectability 
function, κ, defined as causal), he utilized the frame invariance of causation for 
presenting sensing as a new fundamental action of nature by way of pinpointing the 
requisite conservation of feelings in any relativistic description of the sensually-
interacting tissue as physical system4 [e.g. of the sensually-mediated lengthening 
of any biosphere's trophic chains, summarized in 3], not without highlighting in 
advance that the very Plato, in Sophist, spotted this frame invariance – later 
formalized in a symmetry theorem by Emmy Noether [3 § 1.5.5, pp. 465-476] – as 
the mark identifying that which is not mere appearance and never can be such. 
Otherwise, i.e. if causal efficiency not involved frame invariance, perspectives could 
be found in which the causal relationship of a course of physical events would 
appear uncalled for. 
Also of interest for the next discussions is mentioning here that, as evinced 
by the empsyched animals' action (namely, their mentioned elongating the 
biosphere's trophic chains) that at its outset detaches biological evolution from its 
minimal course [10; Fig. 3 in 3, p. 900, and references therein], observable 
efficient causation, i.e. the observers' own one, is of the same nature that the 
unobservable efficient causation. As François-P.-G. Maine de Biran first remarked in 
1823-1824 [6], within the knowledges that minds gain, a quite exact line 
demarcates what there is of passive and of active. In the process of depicting the 
subuniverse through the efficient interaction and discrimination of this observable 
causality from the unobservable causality concealed at the transformations of the 
items found in the surroundings, this demarcation is operative already at the start, 
as recognition of the observer's own reality in the cogito (i.e., in her own action of 
attentional refocusing resisting itself; the cogito is not a reasoning or an inference, 
see Appendix). Whence the importance of knowing that the very Plato himself, in 
his just mentioned book Sophist, also took notice and made argumental use of such 
a cogito, which remained unidentified until 1979, when Mario Crocco – in a later 
phase of his work – exposed it by withdrawing from the text a cloaking 
                                                 
3  Thus leaving for observation only the causation that also observes itself, i.e. minds – which are 
semovient sentiences, namely realities that sense their own transformations and cause some of 
them [cf. 6]. 
4  
"Just likewise – because the requisite conservation of feelings in any relativistic description of the 
sensually-interacting tissue as physical system must, by Noether’s symmetry theorem, correspond 
to certain symmetry in the ways in which nature can be non-indifferent to itself, a symmetry which 
must turn their display periodic and which the brain states that differentially cause them must 
reflect – the regularities of interobject [i.e. intramental] action seem far more confortably elucidable 
after having mapped the dimensions, ranges, and amplitudes on which their close extramental 
effects vary" [3, p. 566; square brackets added].
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interpolation added in the XIXth century by a modern 'Friend of Forms' [3, pp. 81 
(fn. 31) and 927]. Through this unique efficient causation offered in nature, 
localized observers may build the developmental operativity that allows referring 
semiosis (the action of signs) to ever more distant present objects. 
2.5. Efficient causation brings into physics observers and semioses. So found 
by a variety of modern scientific endeavors, neither localized observers, nor their 
time-consuming intellectual development and semioses, can any longer be excluded 
from the physical science's description of such a nature. In this contemporary 
scenario, as discussed below, special relativity therefore is, or ought to be, a 
representation as well as an interconversion procedure of all the localized minds’ 
possible perspectives ("an infinite number of spaces") or reference frames of the 
subuniverse attainable through such a semiotic reference, and not a direct 
representation of the distance-involving subuniverse's states. 
In this way, in sum, on the presentist view which recognizes physical 
causation the fact that the subuniverse is regarded as three-dimensional implies 
that the present moment must be an instant with the interval-like thickness of the 
minimal possible 'delay' demanded by such a frame-invariant physical causation – 
turning such subuniverse fourth-dimensional. This constraint, as already hinted at, 
interestingly varies when causation, rather than physical, is taken to be non-
physical, in the style of the logical relationships among concepts or Platonic Ideas. 
2.6. Physical causation substituted by non-physical relationships. Such 
logical 'causation' takes no fraction of time to set up its results (time or 
transformative sequenciation is indeed illusory in that scenario), and of course 
poses no requisite of frame invariance, which would be superfluous. In this case, 
one lacks any reason to see, and does not see, that to elude that the present 
instant "could be divided into past and future" there is no need at all of positing 
that the instant's nature be nondurational, rather than a collapsed, contingently 
unnavigable yet extant fourth dimension. On the other hand, as Petkov [1, page 2; 
pages are from the Pittsburg website's version] says, "Augustine could not have 
possibly realized that the duration of the moment 'now' must be zero, as he 
concluded, in order that" other conditions become secured. Let me put these 
further conditions as that, all at once, the macroworld be three-dimensional and 
physical causation gets substituted by non-physical relationships ('virtualities') 
between Platonic Ideas – so enervating by the same token past's irredeemability 
and sensuousness' allure. But the presentists who also want to be Platonists, or 
rather nowadays enlist themselves in the Pythagorean-Parmenidean-Platonic-
Puritanical 5 tradition, should see this articulation lucidly. 
Appreciating the bond between the three-dimensionality of the subuniverse 
and its existence only at the present instant puts on view that, if time-courses are 
disconnected from time-generating physical causation and for that reason the 
instant's duration is taken to be zero, then past and future do not exist in any 
sense in the framework of such a presentist view. The fourth dimension is absent. 
                                                 
5 "Puritanical" here refers to the Greek Puritanism whose communities become widespread in hellenized 
societies from the –III to the VII centuries. This Hellenic rigorism shows a general attitude toward 
time and the body also seen in not a few disparate cultures, including the British Puritanism and 
British Platonism of early Modernity. Cf. [15], chapter five: “The Greek Shamans and the Origin of 
Puritanism”. 
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On the contrary, if efficient causation is recognized as enacting time courses, it is 
also recognized as determining both the time's metrics and arrow, and in such a 
presentism the present instant (the non-spatial thickness of macroscopic universe) 
is possessed with a time-like duration whose two borders abutting to non-being, i.e. 
the one toward causally closed situations and the one toward transformable 
situations, feature different properties [3, § 1.3.8 "The Time-studies Framework", 
pp. 309-314] that exhibit an exhaustion of causal efficiency – of which exhaustion 
other instances are known in nature [6]. 
2.7 Is the instant itself dilatable – like intervals? In such a view, the past 
and the future are merely sets of previous and forthcoming states of a three-
dimensional subuniverse which exists solely at the present instant. But these states 
do not stand alone or exist on their own6. The universe is not fundamentally 'split' 
into space and time but such dimensions come from the more fundamental unique 
causation offered in nature, i.e. the frame-invariant efficient enactment of 
alterations, and then streamline it to unfold diversely. Through this unfolding the 
macroworld becomes to consist in its three-dimensional, force-dispersing [3] 
extension (of variable magnitude, so that fresh space may be continuously 
generated amid adjacent localities, e.g. with the subuniverse's expansion) and its 
time-like, causation-harboring thickness (of variable magnitude, i.e. one that may 
occur more or less collapsed between different subuniverses) whose nature and 
intervalic constriction could not exceptuate it from abiding by the kinematic 
relativistic constraints. This last, important feature was recently summarized in [6] 
and here can be convenably quoted (with permission) at some length: 
"For durations that can be measured, one can empirically verify that a 
certain number of physical instants, i.e. a sequence of possible causal 
transformations, must appear dilated if the total duration is assessed 
from the sequence recorder (a clock) of moving observers. The 
antichronic outlook entails assuming some impediment that stops this 
dilational effect for smaller numbers of physical instants. In its view 
short intervals ought not to get dilated, a ban specially applied onto 
the single instant. 
The groundlessness in conjecturing this impediment becomes 
apparent when we consider that no force in the observable universe is 
efficient to cause a transformation in less than about 10
-25
 second 
(imagine 0.000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1 of a second), a 
duration that may also be expressed as its equivalent, namely as 
                                                 
6 This non-existence of past and future states is not to be mistaken with the Aristotelian status of the 
realities belonging with non-substantial categories. Neither for Aristotle, nor for Peripatetism, actual 
existence of past or future is a possible, i.e. something that through potency (steéresis) might gain 
actuality; but that which, not being, cannot either be: Plato's ouk óntos ouk ón. Past and future 
states are essentially and incorrigibly inactual. In Aristotle's categorial schema, states are accidental 
in character. States, 'accidents', or manners of being do not exist on their own without the entity 
which they are states or affections of, so that this entity remains an unchanging subject of change 
(a subject and its attributes or predicates). A substance as such must be changeless and any 
changes can only be in other features (accidents) which are not essential to the underlying 
‘changelessness’ of the entity or substance. But although temporally-thin universe (kósmos) is a 
substance in Aristotle's terms, the actual existence of its past or future states is not an accident 
occurring (symbébekon, accidens) onto such a substance. It is just a nonoccurrence; one, moreover, 
which no potency could redeem. 
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some 10
19
 Planck instants. Every transformation in time is, thus, 
currently ticked on intervals always larger than this one. Such a brief 
interval is accidentally unmeasurable (because any recording-change 
in a clock must be caused by some physical force, but no observed 
physical force could so quickly give rise to any effect). Nevertheless, 
nothing suggests that this ~10
-25
 second interval or a fraction of it is 
intrinsically noncompliant with the Lorentz-FitzGerald transforms. 
Put differently, nothing suggests that this ~10
-25
 second interval or a 
fraction of it be refractory to become dilated and expand in due 
proportion any eventual marking sequence that subdivides it, 
revealing even the duration of those of its fractions (physical instants) 
in which no subdividing mark could ever be set – which if dilated are 
to appear as a still discrete, causally impenetrable blank when 
appraised by moving observers. Where and why might any such 
hindrance to dilation be expected to begin, barring the special-
relativity transforms' validity for fleeting intervals? The antichronic 
outlook demands this impediment in order to judge the physical 
instant unreal. In contrast, it is often thought that the Planck instant 
or Planck time (ħG/c
5
)
1/2 = 5.3916... x 10
-44 second, a minute fraction 
of a second (actually requiring forty-three zeros after the decimal 
point before starting with the mentioned numbers), may name a limit 
for any possible physical force to be efficient in causing a causal 
transformation; namely, that the Planck instant denotes the interval-
like thickness of actuality, whose causal transformations – always 
taking many of such instants because of the cosmologically acquired 
weakness of efficient forces – make real time. But this prospect is 
dismaying for an outlook that struggles against time. It rather wishes 
for a 'block' universe where all intervals were simultaneously real, the 
actually present instant in no way different from the past and future 
ones, and time elapsing just subjective or illusory." 
2.8 The block universe. Rigorisms such as the Pythagorean-Parmenidean-
Platonic-Puritanical tradition offer another view on reality that differs ontologically 
from presentism – pinpointing and decrying the senses' deceitfulness. It is the 
block universe view. In it, to borrow a remark by S. F. Savitt, "There's No Time Like 
the Present": literally so, indeed, as there is no concept of absolute present. Irony 
comes to adorn this keen remark from the paradoxical circumstance that in such a 
tradition the assertion, "There's No Time Like the Present", by no means expresses 
any jubilant reception of present time with corresponding unconcern toward 
inactual past and inactual future, in the style of the notorious Carpe diem! The 
assertion, on the contrary, aims precisely to deny that present time enjoys any 
privilege at all (as it may be the efficient exercise of frame-invariant, absolute 
transformative causation) over nonpresent, only conceivable situations which 
nevertheless are judged 'perduring' somehow or somewhere, beyond mere 
imagination, as purported 'temporal parts' of all what senses find enacted at the 
present. 
This denial of present-time's exclusivity thus contends that things are also 
made of 'temporal parts' 'perduring' away from private fancy, so as to be 
encountered or having been encountered by spatially localized observers in other 
times. In such a subuniverse the definition of simultaneity is necessarily only 
conventional and there are no objective becoming and time flow. This denial can be 
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traced back, not to mention cultural events from early Antiquity and even Mesolithic 
times [2; 3, pp. 567 ff.], to the eternal and unchanging being of the Eleatic school 
of philosophy [a panorama in Ref. 9, Chap. X] and to the rigorist longings [3, p. 
312] for an exemption to waiting and a retrieval of olden days along with a defense 
against envisaged dissolution of the very scholar by time – tempus edax rerum. 
Petkov [1] points out that "Saint Augustine also believed in an everpresent eternity 
which, however, was not accessible to [premortal] humans [14].15In 1884 Hinton 
wrote about a four-dimensional macroworld in which the ordinary particles are 
regarded as threads [16,17]." In each of these threads no physically efficient 
causation was to work to compose time from successive changes. This instances 
still another linked, important feature: the denial of efficiently-causal time usually 
serves to put causal efficiency only on thinking courses and, thus, to fancy that 
rigorous thought is productive of what it thinks. 
2.9. Block universe, unstoppable thought. This 'poietizing thought', as it is 
called, is deemed to occur whether within individuals (as claimed by subjectivisms, 
i.e. the extramentalities-denying worldviews asserting that observers inhabit a 
"gnoseocapsule" [3 § 1.3.24: "Intertwining agencies", pp. 388-392; excerpta are 
provided hereinbelow, in Appendix]) or in the individuals' assimilation (made by 
subjectivism-transcendentalisms, i.e. the subjectivisms logically resigning the 
observers' plurality into the unity of a single transcendental subject) to a primordial 
Lógos (Ma'at) no longer tied up to a more ultimate, enactive Father. The latter 
ideological scheme is often captured, e.g., in myths such as the one of Zeus 
maiming Chronos or outlooks such as those of German Idealism, habitually 
epitomized in Hegel. This 'poietizing' is a condition – and harrypotterish ability to 
summon extramental things out of reasoning – oftentimes subserved by the view 
that 'being' is tantamount to a mere confluence of predications7 (as Anselm of 
Cantorbery 'Proof' exemplifies: "God exists because its concept enlists every 
perfection: as being is more perfect than not being, God's own concept must enlist 
being, thus proving that Gods exists". As to humbler realities, rather, predications 
may be 'properties' or 'proper predicates' such as futurity, presentness, and 
pastness. It should be eagerly remarked that if 'being' amounted to admitting 
predications, nothing essential about the present-now could remain outside the 
realm of predicate-arranging science). Whence this antichronic outlook is often 
detected in those subjectivist and subjectivist-transcendentalist philosophies – and 
the 'P' of 'poietizing' becomes added to this tradition's unpronounceable acronym, 
'PPPPPP'8. 
 
                                                 
7 The concept of essentialist and efficient causations are not identical, presenting realities capable of 
producing the same results, since one views 'to be' as a predicate and the other as an enactment; 
for example, it is by no means clear if a sheerly three-dimensional universe might encompasss 
inertia. 
8 In Spanish, a language in which quite attention has been devoted to explore this topic, a further "P" 
chances to be attached, adding to the pathetism of this acronym's unpronunceableness. "PPPPPP" 
stands for "pensamiento poietizante pitagórico-parmenídeo-platónico-puritano". 
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3 The uncollapsed four-dimensional subuniverse 
 
3.1. Birth of the scientific idea of block universe: 1908. In the quarter of 
century ensuing Hinton's work, a number of rigorisms voiced loud their misgivings 
about presentism. Petkov [1] affirms that the scientific birth of the block universe 
view, however, took place in 1908 when Hermann Minkowski proposed that space 
and time should be united into an inseparable four-dimensional entity – spacetime 
– which he called 'the world'. Minkowski began his talk at the 80th Assembly of 
German Natural Scientists and Physicians with the now famous introduction:  
"The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have 
sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their 
strength. They are radical. Henceforth Space by itself, and Time by 
itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of 
union of the two will preserve an independent reality" [18, p. 75].19 
It should be pointed out that special relativity, and more precisely its four-
dimensional formulation given by Minkowski, is logically contained in Galileo's 
principle of relativity (with a single additional assumption – that the speed of light is 
finite, which was determined experimentally in Galileo's century). This makes only 
more sensible that, as Petkov [1] observes, Minkowski viewed the idea, of the 
subuniverse as being not objectively split into space and time, as worked out from 
experimental evidence and not just as an alternative representation of special 
relativity. In fact no such alternative was in sight. "That is why a genuine 
understanding of special relativity could not be achieved without regarding 
spacetime as a four-dimensional space whose four dimensions are entirely given 9 , 
like the two dimensions of a plane." [1, p. 3]. 
I think that the nature of this restriction is worth close inspection. For, is this 
constraint in any sense comparable to reasonably imposing adherence to a certain 
necessary procedure in order to use a calculation software – or rather to arbitrarily 
imposing loyalty to, say, a certain discretionary worldview, for attaining the same 
purpose? As advanced in the title, we will see later that it rather constitutes a 
Kantian condition of possibility for relativistic calculations, one which does not 
reveal anything about the 'things in themselves' that Kant would have labeled 
'noumenon'. Minkowski  might have hinted at something comparable to the 
previous sentence's first part but he certainly did not take on the second. 
Minkowski's opinion amounted to counting on the possibility that one might 
ratiocinate backward from non-theoretical data to some model or preliminary 
theory. Yet, non-theoretical data have not been found anywhere (see below, § 
4.7); first and foremost, because once observers attain some intellectual 
development they cannot help but deal with their apperceptions: no longer with 
'pristine' sensations. This is specially delicate concerning ontological conclusions. 
                                                 
9 At this juncture Petkov [1, footnote 2] adds: "It might appear tempting to regard the temporal 
dimension as not entirely given, but if this were the case spacetime would not be four-dimensional – 
one cannot talk about a four-dimensional entity if all dimensions are not equally existent. Spacetime 
is not like space since the nature of the temporal dimension is different from the nature of the 
spatial dimensions, but this has nothing to do with the equal existence of all dimensions of 
spacetime (like the different nature of physical objects and phenomena has nothing to do with their 
existence). In this respect I completely share the position of Taylor and Wheeler regarding the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of spacetime: "Equal footing, yes; same nature, no" [19]. 
 196
Szirko:  Why is Time Frame-dependent in Relativity? 
Minkowski's outdated opinion neglected that the collection and recording of raw 
data is always theory-determined, as is the interpretation of data, and even 
methodology. Does this atypical constraint endorse – or either disallow – the widely 
accepted view (discussed below) that "relativistic mechanics does not carry a 
particular ontological interpretation upon its sleeve"? 
3.2. Primary belief: the block universe view as empirical. Petkov [1, p. 3] 
observes that Minkowski left no doubt that the idea of spacetime should be 
understood in this way – as an inseparable, entirely given four-dimensional entity – 
by pointing out one immediate consequence of that idea, namely that one could not 
talk about one space any more. Minkowski in fact noticed that "neither Einstein nor 
Lorentz made any attack on the concept of space" [18, p. 83] and stressed that the 
idea of many spaces is inevitable in special relativity: "We should then have in the 
world no longer space, but an infinite number of spaces, analogously as there are in 
three-dimensional space an infinite number of planes. Three-dimensional geometry 
becomes a chapter in four-dimensional physics. Now you know why I said at the 
outset that space and time are to fade away into shadows, and only a world in itself 
will subsist" [18, pp. 79–80]. But, although (as Petkov notes) Minkowski 
demonstrated that the consequences of specially (kinematically) describing the 
relativity of simultaneity (length contraction, for instance) found a natural 
explanation in the four-dimensional spacetime, I find significant to remark that 
Minkowski did not find it necessary to argue that these consequences were possible 
only in a four-dimensional subuniverse with a non-collapsed realm housing at once 
all the changing states of the cosmos. 
Petkov continues: "Unfortunately, the depth of Minkowski's idea does not 
seem to have been immediately and fully appreciated – as evident from 
Sommerfeld's notes on Minkowski's paper: 'What will be the epistemological 
attitude towards Minkowski's conception of the time-space problem is another 
question, but, as it seems to me, a question which does not essentially touch his 
physics' [20]. 
About two decades after Minkowski's four-dimensional formulation of special 
relativity Weyl appeared to have realized that Minkowski spacetime is not merely a 
mathematical space but represents a four-dimensional external [subuniverse whose 
being entirely given at once] is not directly reflected in our perceptions: 'The 
objective world simply is, it does not happen' [21]."  
Einstein added in 1952 a further appendix, "Relativity and the problem of 
space", to his "Relativity: The Special and General Theory" in which, as Petkov also 
notes, Einstein seemed to have arrived at the same conclusion: "It appears... more 
natural to think of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as 
hitherto, the evolution of a three-dimensional existence" [22]. However, neither 
Weyl nor Einstein showed that the uncollapsed four-dimensionality of the 
subuniverse, and identical existence of a plurality (assumed a non-bounded number 
or infinity) of three-dimensional spaces, 'temporal parts' of everything, or "present-
nows" each with a different distribution of physical occurrences, unavoidably follows 
from the consequences of special relativity. 
3.3. Debate on the empirical grounds of the block universe view. As it is well 
known, Rietdijk [23], Putnam [24] and Maxwell [25] argued that relativity of 
simultaneity – one of the basic underpinnings of special relativity – inevitably 
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assumes an uncollapsed four-dimensional subuniverse. None of them regarded as 
uncollapsed, or even as boundable by opposite and intrinsically different frontiers 
with non-being [3], the timespan or extent of the fourth dimension being 
considered; none of them, either, offered the detailed calculations today customary 
for justifying that, e.g., the twin 'paradox' is not paradoxical at all 10, by showing 
that, in both backward and forward logs, the 'transframing' stays smooth and at 
every instant and accounts for the observable results. However, the argument was 
validly criticized in two occasions by Howard Stein [26, 27] and Petkov mentions 
authors [28] claiming that Stein "has settled the issue". Petkov's work correctly 
shows that, in certain sense, Stein's objections not only do not disprove the 
argument but further reinforce it. This brings about very interesting consequences 
and a bridge between relativity and semiotic researches, discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 studies a more general argument by Petkov, showing that the 
consequences of special relativity and the experiments which confirm them would 
be impossible if the subuniverse were three-dimensional with a present-'now' of 
zero time-like duration and if the existence of the objects involved in these 
experiments is extramental, namely observer-independent or physically 'absolute'.  
Special relativity is a kinematic and not a dynamic portrayal of the behavior 
of physical objects. Namely, its portrayal, although can perfectly take up 
acceleration and represent its materializations as curved worldtubes, does not seek 
to include or refer to the forces enacting causal efficiency, upon the finding of 
whose operative running it could be attributed a non-zero time-like duration to the 
three-dimensional actuality – as its 'thickness'. Taking this into account, the 
mentioned impossibility shows, as Petkov puts it, that only the block universe view 
does not contradict the experimental evidence which supports special relativity. 
Upon this result he explores whether or not an equivalence of three-dimensional 
and four-dimensional presentations of special relativity implies an equivalence of 
three-dimensional and four-dimensional ontologies; I discuss and reinterpret this in 
Section 6. 
 
4 Has Stein Disproved the Rietdijk-Putnam Argument? 
4.1. Summary of the Rietdijk-Putnam Argument. To analyze Petkov's view of 
Stein's objections, let me first go over the main points of the claim that relativity of 
simultaneity inevitably assumes an uncollapsed four-dimensional subuniverse, not 
without remarking beforehand that physics has not observers localized in space. 
What rather can be localized, and engaged into translocative motion whether 
inertial or accelerated, is the observer's immediate circumstance, covolumetric with 
certain states of the observer's brain gray [10] – a factor whose present interest 
resides in that neither observers, nor their meetings or even a single 'event of 
observation', can be pointlike, or unextended. Neurobiology puts thereby a ceiling 
on the accuracy with which physics can represent different reference frames by 
different observers. In computing positions, the observers' extension imposes onto 
the precision of calculations a certain indeterminacy, usually insignificant. It, 
nevertheless, may become not negligible when one tries to ascertain the time-like 
                                                 
10 
Evaluating a path integral along different paths one gets different results, so that the elapsed proper 
time of a twin is less than the other and the latter ages less; references below in the text. 
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thickness with which special relativity finds itself compelled to describe the present 
and simultaneity. 
The relativistic indeterminacy created in this fashion may be judged small, 
though it suffices to prevent special relativity from rigorously considering that time 
dimension does not exist, i.e. that the time-like thickness of present must be 
exactly zero. But we will come later to it. By now let us follow Petkov's and other 
expositions of the topic in considering three pointlike inertial observers A, B, and C 
in relative motion whose worldlines (the lines of their entire lives in time) are 
shown in Fig. 1. Observers A and B meet at event M. The third observer C is 
represented by a vertical worldline in the figure which means that A is approaching 
C, whereas B is receding from C. 
 
 
Figure 1: Rietdijk, Putnam and Maxwell called attention onto this setting, here taken from [1]. Three 
inertial observers A, B, and C are in relative motion. Events M and Q belong to A's present and are 
therefore real and determinate for A, whereas for B real and determinate are events M and P since they 
lie in B's present. 
 
Two events P and Q happen with C at different instants of his proper time. 
The events P and Q are simply the observer C existing at the instants  t C P  and  t C Q  
of his proper time, respectively, in some places at a distance from both inertial 
observers A and B. Both events M and P are equally real for B (according to 
Putnam) or equally determinate for B (according to Rietdijk). Both events M and Q 
are equally real and determinate for A. Putnam and Rietdijk assumed that the 
reality and determinateness of an event is observer-independent or absolute, 
concluding that if event Q is real (determinate) for observer A, it should be as real 
(determinate) for observer B and for observer C as well. Observer C should thus 
exist at once at both instants  t C P  and  t C Q  of his proper time since events P and Q 
(corresponding to the two instants) are equally real. 
But such a situation is not possible in the common-sense (pre-relativistic: 
mammalian, avian, and reptilian) view according to which it is only the present – 
the three-dimensional subuniverse at the instant 'now' – which exists. This led 
Rietdijk and Putnam to conclude that relativity of simultaneity, also called failure of 
simultaneity, when applied to what exists (i.e., to realities assumed to include some 
ones existing at a distance of localized observers), contradicts the presentist view 
and is possible only in a four-dimensional subuniverse where the histories of the 
physical objects are entirely realized in their four-dimensional worldtubes, i.e. their 
entire histories in time and space. In such a view the presents of observers A and B 
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are equally real because they are merely three-dimensional cross-sections of the 
four-dimensional subuniverse – the subuniverse is uncollapsedly four-dimensional. 
4.2. The effective describability of present situations. Stein criticized the 
Rietdijk-Putnam argument, Petkov recaps, "as it incorrectly used the concept of 
distant present events (i.e. the concept of the present). Stein pointed out that 'in the 
theory of relativity the only reasonable notion of present to a space-time point is 
that of the mere identity relation: present to a given point is that point alone – 
literally here-now ' [27, p. 159]." Yet it behooves us to recall that, in order to show 
that observers need not agree on which events are simultaneous, those observers 
need to stand in relative motion, a translationality that precludes to occupy a single 
spacetime point.  
Yet Stein's criticism is valid even if, as Petkov points out, it supports the first 
part of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument – that special relativity shows that there can 
be no objective distinction between past, present and future, whence presentism 
contradicts special relativity and is therefore not to be assumed in relativistic 
descriptions. (In the last section below it is discussed whether this atypical 
constraint also is "noumenally", physically, or ontically appropriate, or it is not). In 
special relativity the present, i.e. the three-dimensional subuniverse at the instant 
'now', if at all definable, can be defined only in terms of the pre-relativistic division 
of events into past, present, and future. Any definition in the style of "present is 
everything efficient to cause transformative effects" cannot be accommodated in 
non-dynamic scenarios, such as those constructed by special relativity. Therefore, 
the present in special relativity is defined as everything that exists simultaneously 
at the present instant.  
Whence Stein's argument that one cannot talk about distant present events 
in the framework of special relativity is a (well-trodden) argument against the 
effective describability of present situations. As it is notorious, describing 
instantaneously the situation of distant present events requires a supernatural 
depiction by a non-localized observer utilizing space as in Newton's image of space 
as "sensorium of God" – or, rather for a PPPPPP, as the sensorium of an ubiquitous 
determining lógos. Stein's is accordingly an argument on which localized observers 
might confidently build.  
Reason is that, for localized observers, reference to events occurring at a 
distance demands analyzing the action of signs (semiosis), turning describability 
inescapably circuitous. As signs should end up detected by the observer's bodily 
receptors, assisted or not by physical or mechanical interfaces, this seems a 
biologically-stemmed indirectness, whose bold reminding our imperfection and 
bodily needs might be taken as offending rigorousness. 
4.3. Semiosis enables describability of present situations. But, like bodily 
constraints, too signs suscitate fiery passions and huge misunderstandings. In an 
essay surveying the claim that relations are 'external' to their terms and exploring 
ontological accounts of this purported externality of relations, Bains [29] observes 
that an understanding of the ontology of relations allows for a compelling account 
of the action of signs, i.e. how things come to stand for something other than 
themselves – distant present events, whose consideration is unavoidable when 
trying to imagine the local perspectives of observers reciprocally engaged in 
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relativistic-speed motion, as in our present case. Bains [29 Chapter One, "An Even 
Briefer History of Relations", quoted with permission] puts it so: 
Aristotle is interested in the really real, distinguished as the way 
things are independently of the mind – extra-animam. … The problem 
with []his way of approaching things is that relations between 
individual substances become metaphysical nuisances. … as Weinberg 
notes (1965: 63), very few philosophers seem to have realized why 
'relations cannot really be fitted into a substance-accident ontology.' 
Remember that for Kant categories were things of the mind or mental 
entities – the subjective forms of understanding – whereas for 
Aristotle the mind does not impose its own relations on the sensory 
manifold. … As might become mind-blowingly evident, neither of these 
alternatives is adequate in accounting for our experience, or for 
describing how semiosis (the action of signs) actually works. 
… There are two attempts at categorizing the relative in the 
Categories. Aristotle's first attempt is as follows: 
Those things are called relative which, being either said to be 
of something else or related to something else, are explained 
by reference to that other thing.11 
Now Aristotle recognizes that this definition contained some ambiguity 
as to whether relation constituted a distinct category of being within 
the substance-accident scheme, and decides that he has to modify it: 
Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was 
complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that 
no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not 
complete, if those things are only properly called relative in 
the case of which relation to an external object is a 
necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation 
of the dilemma may be found. 
The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but 
the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something 
else does not make it essentially relative.12 
As Deely astutely notes (1974: 867), 'this distinction between what 
must be explained by reference to something without having itself to 
be a relation, and what is essentially a reference to something other 
than that on which it is founded or based, is the first recorded glimpse 
of what was to become the Latin distinction within the order of 
relation between what is relative secundum dici [according to the way 
it must be expressed in discourse] and what is relative secundum esse 
[according to the way it has being].' Articulating this distinction and 
showing how it is relevant to semiosis and an order of being – the 
ontological status of the being of relation – that is neither substantial 
nor accidental, neither subjective nor objective, but rather preceding 
any categorial schema, is what this story is about: i.e. the being of 
                                                 
11 Aristotle, Categories, ch. 7, 6a36-39. In The Basic works of Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon, trans. E. 
M. Edghill  (NY: Random House, 1941), p. 17 [Bains' footnote]. 
12 Categories, ch. 7, 8a28-34. Edghill trans., loc. cit., p. 22 [Bains' footnote]. 
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the middle, distinct from the terms of the relation; the exteriority of 
relations to their terms; or an event of interbeing. 
Now we have reached a threshold. This distinction between relatio 
secundum dici and relatio secundum esse was discussed throughout 
the medieval period … The difficulty in grasping this distinction 
between relative terms and the relations themselves is twofold. First, 
apart from Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis (first published in 1632), its 
proper thematic articulation has almost totally disappeared from our 
conceptual landscape since the time of William of Ockham and the rise 
of nominalism around 1350 which denied an ontological status to 
relations independently of their terms. Second, Aristotle used the 
expression to pros ti to refer not only to relations themselves, but to 
the things which have relations. This contributed to the only slowly-
dawning (and soon to fade) awareness that every 'thing,' or term, is 
'relative' in two different ways: Firstly, it can only be understood with 
reference to other things (relatio secundum dici); secondly, there are 
the ontological relations that the 'thing' is actually involved in (relatio 
secundum esse). Subtle perhaps … Terminology [is as follows:] 
1. Relatio secundum dici (Relation according to the way it must be 
expressed in discourse). 
2. Relatio secundum esse (Relation according to the way it has 
being). 
The main point [was] To be able to really be a relation, although 
existentially dependent on some relative foundation, or to only be 
something that is relative to other things, but without there actually 
being a relation 'external' to its terms: that was the question. … 
Ockham accepts order and unity in the universe, objective similarity, 
causal connection; but he insists that this unity, causality, etc., 
consists only in the terms themselves, and is conceived by relational 
concepts in the mind. This is the view that Kant will effectively 
radicalize: it is by a property of our mind, the form of outer sense, 
that we represent the shape, magnitude, and relation of things to one 
another. … It was the genius of Russell, in effect, to seek in the reality 
of relation a way through the mind-dependent structures of discourse 
to the mind-independent reality of things. It was the genius of 
[Aquinas], after all those years, to have given rise to a tradition that 
has within its resources the wherewithal to uncover the very path 
whose existence Russell suspected but failed to uncover. This 
discovery is not something to crow over. Only one man – John Poinsot 
– … seems ever to have suspected, as Russell did, that the path was 
there (Deely: 1975: 306)." 
4.4. Three-dimensional presentism as an effect of discourse. Now Stein, 
Rietdijk, Putnam, Maxwell, and Petkov recognize that presentism contradicts special 
relativity and therefore one cannot talk about distant present events in special 
relativity. Yet one wishes doing it; moreover, inescapably one must do it in order to 
show that observers need not agree on which events are simultaneous. To this 
purpose observers must be in relative motion, preventing them from being non-
spatial or occupying a single spacetime point.  
How to discount unavoidable distance? Should the struggle for more ken be 
a struggle against time? Is there a cost, perchance, by defraying which one could 
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refer to distant present events? Is this reference possible only by introducing 
Minkowski spacetime – or rather, the block-universe outlook which it conveys – as 
an inescapable condition? Owes this relationship with the subuniverse to the way it 
has being, secundum esse, or either to the way it must be expressed in discourse, 
secundum dici?  
For, special relativity's descriptions are related to the means for observers to 
exchange kinetic (namely, not dynamic) states and, in so doing, positions from 
which to establish relationships with other realities such as rods, interstellar trains, 
and force carriers whose physical action, no matter how long a travel obtrudes, 
must be instantaneously and locally delivered in order to cause a change. 
Describability of distant present events thus depends on elaborate semioses, whose 
Piagetian development in every individual observer was sketched before. It brings 
always a past element which, among other constraints coming from the structures 
of discourse, must be included in relativistic portrayals. 
So, Stein's criticism is effective against the fully accurate describability of 
the three-dimensional subuniverse, inasmuch as a three-dimensional subuniverse 
only consists of distant present events (everything that exists simultaneously at the 
instant 'now'). Stein's criticism is tantamount to demand, very justifiedly indeed, a 
rigorous analysis of semiosis; an analysis which too often was missing, e.g., in 
accounts of the twin 'paradox' and other 'failures' of simultaneity. But – Petkov 
avows – unfortunately Stein did not address the most fundamental question raised 
by the unavoidableness with which relativity of simultaneity inevitably involves and 
requires an uncollapsed four-dimensional subuniverse. What is the dimensionality 
of the macrosubuniverse according to special relativity? Had he done that he would 
have had three options: 
• accept the conclusion of Rietdijk and Putnam that we live in a four-
dimensional block universe, the things being constituted by unremitting 
temporal parts; or 
• accept the conclusion of Rietdijk and Putnam but investigating if 
1. the four-dimensional span is greater than what causation demands, 
so 'hanging' all transformational courses in our subuniverse;  
2. or, the four-dimensional span is smaller than what causation 
demands, so preventing any transformation from coming to be in our 
subuniverse;  
3. or, the four-dimensional span is neither more nor less of what 
causation demands, so allowing in our subuniverse transformational courses 
in causal sequence;  
4. or efficient causation does not exist at all, so merging with the first 
option (above) in forcing any (thus, apparent) sequence in our subuniverse 
to really exist all at once, given completely or 'in block'; 
• or, as his third option, regard the event "here-now" as the only real – and 
accurately describable – one. 
4.5. The menace of event solipsism: strength of the subjective flank. The 
latter option, of course, does not appear realistic if one thinks that such a view 
clearly amounts to event solipsism – for every observer the extramental 
subuniverse would be reduced to a single event (the event "here-now") and as a 
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result too the intramental complexity would be so reduced (since the surroundings' 
complexity was found requisite for interactive development of the mental world). 
Yet the supposition fails both on its subjective and objective flanks. Let us comment 
on the two. 
As about the subjective flank, everyone's phenomenal experience, by its 
being multifaceted and compounded rather than undividably-evented or 'block 
mentality', contradicts this reduction to a single event and, too, any claim of its 
ultimacy. For, "It is proper of the soul to have a lógos that builds up itself" 
(Heraclitus, fragment 115), and which one of one's mental contents would be 
ultimate? The so-settled issue is not new. It is linked to the answer, of fundamental 
momentousness in the Western History of Ideas, culturally responding to Gorgias’ 
apory13 by making transzendentale the synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption, and 
its evolution was historically reviewed in two important and interrelated syntheses 
by Rodolfo Mondolfo [30,31] and Section 2.8.2, "Concepts of the unifying function 
of experiencing", in [3, pp. 686-702]. Quoting from the latter (square brackets 
added): 
"Aristotle’s research-design, uncolliding with Plato’s technical 
affirmation of the spiritual psyché as a decisive and imprescindible 
condition of every sapience (or: physical measurement), focuses (in 
his fundamental Chapter VII of Perì aistheéseoos kaì aistheetoôn, 447 
- 449) on the possibility of sensing two things in one same and 
psychologically indivisible moment of time by means of one unique 
sensation. 
                                                 
13 In [3], p. 686, this apory is commented ad follows: "Gorgias’ splitting, the Danæan gift. The starting 
point in the Western thought, for these researches on the unifying function of the experiencing, was 
the extreme form reached by the sensualist phenomenism in Gorgias (-Vth century). Along with 
reducing every possible sapience to sensation, he added that it is not communicable (the noematic 
Unübertragbarkeit pointed by Prof. [Max] Born: the one due to structurelessness, not that due to 
cadacualtez); not only from one experiencing to other (e. g., from yours to ours) but, also, even 
from each set of sense’s sentiences (in any of their thetic modes) to any simultaneous other. So, the 
personal experiencing inside any single organism was postulated as multiple, because of the 
separation of the different sensations into stanch compartments, mutually incommunicable. Like the 
blindness for the noetic incommunicability of cadacualtic availabilities, this atomization is typical of 
every sensualist phenomenism and a consequence of it, as often evinced, for example, in the French 
sensualism of the XVIIIth century (with Diderot, and specially with Condillac) and parallel Eastern 
developments. It offered itself to Plato’s especial reflection, as in Theaetetus 184 b sq., where he 
refined his critique of sensualist empiricism. There, Plato denied and rejected that each sense 
modality could enjoy by itself a direct and exclusive apprehensional grasping of its own sensations. 
To clarify the need of a unifying conspection ("binding"), Plato forwarded the comparison with the 
Danæan gift, that Prof. Jakob much often recalled when recounting the history of the understanding 
of the sensations’ conspectivity [and, as well, in other context, i.e. regarding the annexation of 
subjective intonations to the physiological relaxation of the gray’s system of reverberative 
stationarities: a "regalo dáneo", he remarked, since so few joys bring about so many afflictions; see 
"What is a person?", in [3] § 2.13.4.1, "The definition of persons"]. Inside the wooden horse of 
Troy, each Danæan warrior stayed distinct and separated. But the functional purpose, or systemic 
finality, of both Greek warriors and separated animal senses, requires a mutual unifying binding: 
one adunating agencies previously apart. Bare sharing a receptacle is not good enough. Then the 
[PPPPPP's] syncretic myth inspired a critique, of the aptitude of sense sentiences to constitute a 
psychism (Theæt. 184 bc), even if this psychism was sort of fungible stuff. Are senses sensible, or 
instead mere organs, reporting to a reality more valuable for the myth’s values?" 
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This crucial query had been already set forth by the Pythagoreans. In 
their casting, it befitted the perception of musical accords, whose 
compounding 'notes' (the Pythagoreans affirmed) are discerned 
because they are not perceived simultaneously, but by intermixing 
betwixt them certain unperceived intervals, whose intermediate 
situational transformations are insensible on account of their brevity. 
A naive remark, brimming of baleful repercussions. 
During these sub-acuity intervals, as Aristotle ordered to write, "one 
ought not to know if oneself exists, if sees and if feels": a horrible 
prospect when one’s reduction to one’s grasp is in the loom ([3] 
§ 2.5.1). Aristotle concluded that, inside one sole sense, it is not 
feasible to feel two things at once with a unique sensation. So he told 
apart two unities, that of sensation (incompatible with distinguishing 
component impressions) and that of cognoscitive synthesis (attained 
by comparing and discerning two impressions simultaneously produced 
in one sense). 
In this way, Aristotle achieved a chance to reject the unperceived 
intervals, acquiescing in the syncretic myth [of PPPPPP], on the 
ground that the unperceived sub-acuity intervals could be likewise 
postulated not inside each separate sense, but to sensations of 
different senses. In such eventuality, it could be also held in like 
fashion that it only 'seems' to us seeing and hearing jointly, because 
the intermediate intervals elude us. This would straightforwardly 
usher into conceiving noesis as a flashing physical phenomenon. But 
such a verdict was culturally untenable, owing to having supposed 
past and future not really different from present, therefore imagining 
that a multiplicity of non-simultaneous flashes could get mutually lost. 
In fact, as anticipated supra, any time-'fragmentation' of the 
biographies, insofar as self-addressable, by no means precludes the 
unitary constitution of psychaí, since the subuniverse shows to be 
temporally thin on the duration of its actuality and its situations either 
include, or exclude, such unique self-addressable fragment. And, for 
adversaries of elapsing productive time, besides being culturally 
untenable, such a verdict was privately deleterious. 
Thus, obedient to the myth, Aristotle objected that 'this is not true, 
and it can neither be any insensible time nor escape our grasping, but 
it is natural that everything be sensed.' " [3, pp. 689-690]. 
4.6. The menace of event solipsism: strength of the extramental flank. As 
for the second, extramental flank, event solipsism (reduction of the subuniverse to 
a single ascertainable event or non-spatial "here-now") by no means stands for a 
real possibility inasmuch as every observer observes extended over a volumetric 
parcel of nature, as summarized in [3, 32]. This extramental parcel is not an 
inespatial point; to call up familiar instances, it rather is the volume segment of 
nature overlapping our encephalic gray. Structures in this volume accomplish the 
physiological dissimilations which became evolutionarily selected because, in turn, 
they efficiently originate mental differentiations as causal reactions [6]. By no 
means a sole ascertainable event, such a parcel is thus the fragment or section of 
nature whose biophysically-dissimilated states, spatially extended, do causally 
interact with the observer who is a single existentiality. The states of this not-
pointlike parcel of nature perform the cerebral dissimilation of the circumstanced 
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mind’s structural contents, differentiating in this observer existentiality also a 
plurality of fresh sensations and enacting the aforementioned behavior through 
which this observer probes the surroundings and, so, attains the intellectual 
development required to carry out relativistic observations, measurements, and 
constructions. As a result, for every relativistic observer the spatial subuniverse 
existing once at a time, far from being forcibly reduced to a single event (a "here-
now" unorganizable eventuation of cognoscibility), can become semiotically 
referrable at a distance yet with adaptive accuracy, through the localized observer's 
numerous differentiations ('mental contents') acquired in the course of his 
intellectual development. This semiosis at a distance is what the relativistic 
constructions of simultaneously unmeasurable positions amount to. 
For this localized observer, ascertaining the genuine simultaneity of any pair 
of observed events, namely whether or not is he facing a simultaneity that as such 
admits or may exhibit causal efficiency, does certainly bring troubles, because the 
said semiosis at a distance was not biologically selected for covering all the cases; 
astronomical observations provide good illustration. The relativity of simultaneity 
finds in celestial mechanics, precisely, an important field demanding the use of 
relativistic descriptions, whereas as regards stellar navigation biological adaptations 
remain utterly nonchalant. But what matters for our discussion is that, had Stein 
addressed the issue of what is the dimensionality of the subuniverse according to 
special relativity, he had not been compelled to reject presentisms (neither the 
time-denying nor the time-acknowledging ones) owing to assuming that presentism 
entails an untenable reduction of observer and observation to a non-distanceable 
(non-spatial), "here-now" single event. Neither organism-regulating existentialities 
(psychaí) nor the subuniverse (i.e. each portion of reality evolving from a single 
big-bang) are bounded to stay undifferentiated, as a single initial event (eclosion to 
a given circumstance, for every organism-regulating existentiality; big-bang, for 
subuniverses). Quite the reverse, after their respective eclosion event they 
differentiate themselves following causal courses: respectively, into mental worlds, 
and into astrophysical-biological cosmologies. 
4.7. Odds of accurately describing distant present events. Therefore, the 
(non-rigorous, as immediately commented) statement of fact, that measurements 
should always be locally performed and cannot be carried out at a distance, does 
not entail that separative distances must be deemed unreal and, for that reason, 
the dimensions of spatiality ought to be reduced to zero-dimensionality ('point 
universe'), as if semiosis at a distance not existed. In fact, with a sole 
(neurobiological) exception whose discussion is of no use here (see ref. [6]), a 
distance negligeable for pragmatics always interposes between measured and 
measurer, and when e.g. one ascertains, with considerable imprecission, some 
assumed spatial relationships of galaxies or metagalaxies, one simply increases 
such a distance in a way that it no longer remains negligeable – and accompanies 
measurements with estimates of error and hermeneutical instructions. 
Science proceeds this way far and wide. Thus one comes to primarily deal 
with real extramental things, for example real cups, out of one’s mind and at a 
distance there on some table, or events farther away in space, though upon 
introspection one might also consider one's 'concept' of them. Thus, as the natural 
sciences find knowers and knowledges in nature, the proper object of every mind’s 
intellection is the causal composibilities of the sensed outer reality that, in their 
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(extramental) reactions to the mind's causally efficacious, spontaneous probing, 
generated the generalizing retexturing underwent and retained by the mind’s 
knowable build-up. It distinguishes intellection from sensation, though this 
distinction is by no means absolute. In other words, once the question "What is the 
dimensionality of the subuniverse?" is asked, one could not reject presentism by 
assuming that only the detached event "here-now" is real and it would mean that 
for every observer the subuniverse would be zero-dimensional, i.e. just one event. 
As space is pervasive, distance always obtrude; and as efficient causality works, at 
least some observers and some subuniverses differentiate into a plurality of events 
and mental contents. 
Before leaving this topic, it should be stressed that it amounts to a 
contradiction in terms to say that the subuniverse is four-dimensional, but for every 
observer only the event "here-now" is real. A block is a block. If the subuniverse is 
four-dimensional all its events (which only could be really plural in number on 
condition that the fourth dimension is collapsed so as to allow efficient causation to 
produce change) are equally real ('block universe'); otherwise, it would not be four-
dimensional .  The real issue is, if those equally real events are entirely given 
beforehand, maybe just being observed – or presenting themselves to observation 
– sequentially; or, if rather they can engage themselves into real transformative 
courses, which may seem to course in preexisting time but in fact do create such a 
course not by using a navigable timespan external to the present but in the innerly 
transforming, preexisting, time-like thin reality, making way like as running long 
distance in a threadmill, without need of availing of an uncollapsed, perduring, 
navigable time dimension: se hace camino al andar (way is made moving). This 
latter possibility demands both the reality of frame-invariant efficient causation and 
its dovetailing with such a fourth-dimension's span. (As already intimated, if the 
fourth dimension is collapsed down to the minimal timespan required for efficient 
causation, no transformation event may occur contained within such a time-like 
thickness 14; if, in contrast, the universe is uncollapsedly four-dimensional, it may 
contain a multiplicity of events but not their transformations; in both cases, the 
entirety of occurrences cancels its non-being at once, preventing elapsing, edacious 
time – the devourer of things, as Ovid said – and objective becoming from 
existing.)  
4.8. No resource to 'potency' – or, the specter of steéresis. This, as Petkov 
points out, shows that in spacetime it is impossible to have an event, representing 
the event "here-now", which is 'more real' than the other events. Therein realness 
is homogeneously distributed, making such block universe a block of being, 
tantamount to a being in block. Interestingly, this ontic homogeneity does not fail 
when the fourth dimension gets collapsed or anyway restricted in its span and, as it 
meets some features of efficient action, the block gets pulverized into a really 
changing plurality of interacting entities. In that plurality it does not matter that 
one event be so much immediate to an observer that it directly causes in such 
observer known reactions (sensations: e.g., certain field state variation within the 
brain), whereas other events stand so much remote (e.g., a possible interaction 
between quasars) that their positions should be ascertained through this observer's 
                                                 
14 Events are enacted at the boundary with non-being which has not exhausted causal efficiency; not at 
the opposite one. 
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intellectual development and its application to semiosis, i.e. through a complex 
construal of nature based on the evolutionary natural selection of proper 
neurobiological analyzers plus the mind-texturing accumulation of personal 
probings plus their ensuing collation and the social decanting of the resulting 
experience [33]. Whether immediate or, instead, remote to the observer, all the 
events recognized to be existing in a fourth dimension-endowed macrouniverse 
ought to be deemed on an equal footing as regards their reality. In a four-
dimensional subuniverse whether with uncollapsed or with causation-matching 
collapsed fourth dimension, objective flow of time and objective becoming are 
therefore impossible if they implied that there are events which are 'more real' than 
the other spacetime events. 
In such circumstances, event P could not be 'potential' while event Q is real, 
or viceversa. Far from being a predicate or a simulatable appearance, 'to be' is an 
all-or-none issue – an enaction outwardly manifested as an invariant conservation, 
following the aforementioned Plato's hint and Emmy Noether’s theorem [32]. As it 
is notorious since those remarks by Plato, causal efficiency involves frame 
invariance, i.e., no perspective could be found in which the causal relationship of a 
course of physical events would appear uncalled for, because both transforming 
preexisting beings and cancelling their non-existence are efficient enactments: far 
from being a predicate or a logical or discursive capacity, 'to be' is a causal 
enactment.  
So ruled out possibility (the 'being possible', potency) to account for 
observer C's living both A's and B's diverse simultaneities, ruling out probability is 
even plainer, even though the complications brought by notions like 'molecular 
disorder' to several sectors of physics (such as plasm turbulence, viscosity, or 
thermal conductivity) have been huge. But special relativity's constructions are not 
statistical. Were they so, potency or Aristotelian steéresis, in the form of 
probabilities, could be used as a shortwriting for what mechanics provides on 
individual cases, like as a hundred and ten years ago Boltzmann recognized for gas 
theory. But special relativity is an interconversion procedure which, being forced to 
deal with particular configurations in order to make predictions which can become 
experimentally tested, cannot eschew facing up to what individually exists or, by 
yielding statistical results, accommodate some fiction of potential being. For this 
reason, i.e. the real distinction between existence and characterization which 
precludes exhausting 'to be' into any combination of proper predications, none of its 
described events can be 'more real' than the other events, so that the question of 
the dimensionality of the subuniverse clearly precedes the questions of time flow 
and becoming – and, as Petkov claims, should be resolved first. 
Still another reason, also in Petkov's view. Stein could not either argue that 
existence should be relative, i.e. frame- or observer-dependent – a condition which 
would preserve the zero-intervalic-thickness, three-dimensionality of the 
subuniverse and would allow two observers in relative motion to have different 
presents, i.e. different three-dimensional subuniverses – because this would mean 
that he would be again using the concept of distant present events applied to each 
observer. 
4.9. The strength of Stein's argument. In such a way, Petkov points out that 
Stein's criticism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument not only does not disprove it but 
effectively constitutes another argument for the block universe view as the sole 
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worldview compatible from relativity. Stein's criticism is tantamount to state that a 
science of physics acknowledging the relativity or failure of simultaneity cannot 
declare the macroscopic subuniverse sheerly three-dimensional, since a three-
dimensional subuniverse is defined in terms of the pre-relativistic division of events. 
Petkov remarks that by pointing out the meaninglessness of that concept in 
special relativity Stein effectively demonstrated the contradiction between the 
presentist (sheerly three-dimensionalist) view and relativity of simultaneity. This 
meant that it is the four-dimensionalist view that is in agreement with relativity – 
although, as discussed below, one can not yet conclude thereof that the only option 
which remains is an uncollapsedly four-dimensional subuniverse with a 'time' akin 
enough to space (of course not identical: while in space we can only measure ratios 
but reproductably, in measuring time we directly ascertain the causal production of 
new situations but nonreproductably, as it is pointed up by the disparity of 
invariants and transformations in their respective geometries) to let that 'temporal 
parts' perdure differently localized and observers might get 'translocatable' among 
them as well as in space.  
Weingard [34], like Stein, pointed out that Putnam's argument is wrong 
because it is based on the pre-relativistic concept of distant present events. Petkov 
insists that both objections are different but they boil down to the same point – that 
the pre-relativistic (presentist) division of events into past, present and future ones 
makes no sense in special relativity. Despite being formulated in terms of pre-
relativistic concepts the Rietdijk-Putnam argument remains perfectly valid [35] as it 
points out the unbreakable ties of special relativity and four-dimensionality.  
 
5 Only the Four-dimensionalist View is Compatible with 
Special Relativity 
5.1. Probing a generalized version of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument. Petkov 
[1, p. 8] feels that the Rietdijk-Putnam-Maxwell argument can be easily generalized 
if the question of the dimensionality of the macroworld according to special 
relativity is explicitly addressed. In so doing he finishes by showing that special 
relativity is valid only in an uncollapsedly four-dimensional subuniverse represented 
by Minkowski spacetime (and in its time-collapsed segments only inasmuch they 
are referred to by it), but starts to discuss that question by pointing out to the pre-
relativistic (presentist) subuniverse that is sheerly three-dimensional – the present 
of zero intervalic thickness visualizable by thinning to nil the plane in Fig. 2. Then 
he faces two ways to demonstrate the impact of special relativity on this panorama. 
• On the one hand, one can first point out that the macroworld cannot be 
sheerly three-dimensional and still be in line with a failure of simultaneity 
deemed not to depend either on observers' features or on the signals' delay. 
Reason is, that such a macroworld is defined in terms of a pre-relativistic 
division of events into past, present, and future (Fig. 2) which entails 
unmodifiability of the 'earlier-later' relationship. The relativity of 
simultaneity, when applied to what exists, thus contradicts sheer three-
dimensionality, being only possible in a four-dimensional subuniverse where 
the histories of the physical objects either (a) are sequentially deployed by 
an efficient causation whose discrete modules of enaction match the residual 
 209
Electroneurobio log ía  vol. 13 (3), pp. 181-237, 2005 
 
time-like span of a collapsed fourth dimension, or (b) are entirely realized 
("given at once") in the four-dimensional worldtubes stacking their 
"temporal parts". But efficient causation is not included in special relativity 
scenarios. Therefore, the debate over the dimensionality of the subuniverse 
is resolved in favor of the four-dimensionalist view assuming a space-akin 
time dimension uncollapsed - and things existing at all moments of their 
histories. This is the conclusion that follows from Stein's argument against 
the Rietdijk-Putnam argument. 
• Petkov's second approach to determining the dimensionality of the 
subuniverse according to relativity is precisely the generalization of the 
Rietdijk-Putnam argument. One starts with the mentioned pre-relativistic 
view of the subuniverse. Then it inescapably follows that having different 
sets of simultaneous events two observers in relative motion have different 
three-dimensional subuniverses of zero intervalic thickness, i.e. different 
presents. On this generalization, rather than special relativity, it is such a 
null time-like thickness what prevents accommodating efficient causation, 
thereby eschewing causal quandaries.  
In this scenario, inasmuch as existence is absolute, i.e. inasmuch as every 
cancellation of non-being is a causal enactment which, as such, does not 
admit anamorphosis (simulation or physical mimesis, cf. [3], passim), in 
order that relativity of simultaneity be possible it follows that either the 
different subsets of simultaneous events should reflect a relation secundum 
dici, or the subuniverse must be uncollapsedly four-dimensional: the two 
observers will have different sheerly three-dimensional cross-sections of the 
four-dimensional subuniverse, which cross-sections they will regard as their 
presents. But, again, if we assumed that the macroworld is sheerly three-
dimensional, two observers in relative motion would have a common three-
dimensional subuniverse and therefore a common set of simultaneous 
events – which means that not only existence is absolute but also 
simultaneity would be absolute, in contradiction with special relativity. 
 
Figure 2: Nature's time-like thickness; the main feature here is the thickness of the 'plane' of present. 
On both presentist views, i.e. the fourth-dimension-denying and the fourth-dimension-acknowledging 
ones, it is only the present – the three-dimensional subuniverse at the instant 'now' – that exists. For 
the first sort (time-denying), the plane's thickness is zero (the thickness of any other simultaneity plane 
is zero, too) and the sole efficient causation occurs among Ideas (Platonisms) or ideas (subjectivisms). 
For the other sort of presentism (time-acknowledging), the plane's thickness is interval-like and related 
to fundamental physics, whose causal efficiency enacts time courses. These course as transformations 
of the extant being and not on a time dimension, which indeed stays at this scenario but has collapsed 
into the time-like thickness of its present. Future and past sequences, thus, do not exist. 
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In forwarding the generalized version of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument, 
Petkov observes [1, p. 9] that the kinematic relativistic effects (with the exception 
of the so called twin 'paradox') only can be formulated in terms of the pre-
relativistic division of events if the (absolute) existence of the objects involved in 
these effects is explicitly taken into account. And indeed as we have seen relativity 
of simultaneity makes sense only in terms of the non-relativistic concept of 
absolutely present events when we ask what exists simultaneously. If one objects 
that the question "What exists simultaneously?" does not appear to be well defined 
because of the unavoidable spatial distance that brings into every measurement the 
need of semiosis, it will be shown below that the purely kinematic length 
contraction effect makes sense only in terms of the pre-relativistic concept of 
present events of null time-like thickness. Why? Because special relativity draws 
only kinematic situations. Kinematics does not consider efficient causation, which 
rather form the basis for dynamics and is excluded from both time-denying 
presentisms and block-universe special relativity scenarios. 
5.2. Special relativity's ties with the uncollapsed four-dimensionalist view. 
For that reason, when the issue of the dimensionality of the subuniverse according 
to special relativity is explicitly addressed, it does appear that according to special 
relativity there is no alternative to the uncollapsed four-dimensionalist view. Special 
relativity, a kinematic and not a dynamic contrivance, is telling us that the world 
must be depicted this way or no relativistic depiction is possible at all.  
Rather, in the collapsed four-dimensional presentisms only one situation at a 
time, namely the privileged, causally efficient situation whose transformational 
sequences are frame-invariant and in several languages is called 'actuality', could 
be simultaneously present; not a plurality of successive situations each of which 
depends on its observer's motions. This is best seen if one tried to assume that 
according to the 'failure' of simultaneity the macroworld is three-dimensional. Then 
not only relativity of simultaneity but all kinematic relativistic effects would be 
impossible [35, 36, 37]. Petkov remarks that this is immediately evident for the 
cases of length contraction and time dilation, since these effects are merely 
manifestations of relativity of simultaneity – a relativity unretainable while 
simultaneity is absolute. 
5.3. Proof one: discussing the length contraction effect. Therefore, there is 
no kinematic way of gaining the two, simultaneity's relativity as well as 
absoluteness, as children do in choosing at once both irreconcilable things between 
which they should retain only one (katà tèen tôon paídoon eujeén: Plato’s Sophist 
249 d 2/3, quoted in [3] § 1.3.28, in fine). Simultaneity should either fail or be 
absolute. To demonstrate the impossibility of the kinematic relativistic effects in the 
framework of the presentist three-dimensionalist view, Petkov considers for 
example the length contraction effect, as two observers A and B in relative motion 
meet at event M. 
Traditionally, observers in relativity have been characterized fairly sketchily, 
but while making headway on many avenues science remains a single endeavor. 
Thus listing some key requeriments imposed by other academic disciplines focuses 
our fancy, befits our discussion, and steers clear of ontological assumptions that 
might be subreptitiously introduced by concealed denials of space or time – such as 
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speaking of pointlike observers, pointlike meetings, pointlike events of observation, 
instantaneous changes, and instantaneous detections. The meeting observers, thus, 
are non-infinite: they only can observe some events of variation occurring in their 
own ontological buildup and cannot observe any event taking place elsewhere, 
whether in extramentality or in the buildup of other observers [6, 32]. Therefore, 
their meeting is not a gnoseological fusion: each of them keeps observing only the 
own buildup. This buildup is interactively accessable from extramentality not by 
way of a sizeless inespatial point, but by way of a neuroactivity occupying certain 
sizeable volume. The observers' meeting is not epistemological fusion, either: it 
does not exceptuate them from enacting shareable procedures aimed to 
ascertaining if, through dependable semiosis, some of the events which they 
separately detect in themselves are indeed referrable to one and the same 
extramental occurrence.  
Petkov represents these observers by their worldlines as shown in Fig. 3. A 
rod at rest in A's reference frame is represented by its worldtube. But here it seems 
necessary to do exactly the reverse of what we did a moment ago when pointing 
the relevant, unnegligeable physical features of observers, signals, and meeting. As 
the Babylonian observed that when someone points to the moon others may just 
look at the finger, in order to stay away from supposing that also a rod's non-
geometrical or physical properties hold here any relevance whatsoever it is 
important to remark that in relativity the rod demarcates or merely represents a 
certain small piece of A's travel path.  
 
 
Figure 3 as posted by Petkov [1, p. 10]: A rod represented by its worldtube is at rest in observer 
A's reference frame. The rod extends over a small piece of the travel path. Thus it may display 
whatever shape; the discussed effects affect the physical rod only inasmuch as it has extension 
in the relative motion's direction, which the simplified diagram cannot make apparent.  
 
At event M the two observers determine the length of the rod in their 
reference frames. For B the rod, i.e. the said small segment of A's travel path, is of 
shorter length LB < LA. The exact relation between the two lengths is obtained by 
the Lorentz transformations, which do show that LB < LA. As seen in Fig. 3 the 
contraction of the rod or segment of A's travel path is only possible either if (a) the 
worldtube of the rod or segment of A's path is a real four-dimensional object or (b) 
if the observers' speed affect their respective semioses in the context of a fourth 
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dimension collapsed in a fashion that matches the causal span. This means that 
either 
• 
• 
the rod or segment of A's travel path exists equally at all instants of its 
history, or 
its two tips at one and the same instant t0 emit signals with the same state 
of uniform motion on whose arrival ('observation') such signals are efficient 
to immediately cause, in the observer circumstanced to the moving positions 
setting up the four-dimensional trajectory B, the time-insuming process of 
measurement of a difference which is semiotically referrable – in the context 
of some description of nature that is enough adequate or epistemologically 
sufficiently accurate (i.e., not hallucinatory) and has been developmentally 
prearranged in the observer's buildup – to the space length that at t0 has 
been separating the two signal-emission events. 
Petkov observes that the instantaneous three-dimensional spaces of A and B 
intersect the worldtube of the rod at two different places and B's cross-section is 
smaller than A's cross-section. But the descriptions of special relativity, as it only 
poses sheerly kinematic scenarios, cannot involve causal action – and of course 
special relativity has not depicted with any detail its observers positioned in nature, 
not to mention their causality and absolute motions involved in probing the 
surroundings and, thus, building the menu of mental operations to be 
developmentally prearranged in the observer's buildup for apperceiving sensations 
and penetrating nature's causal works. If according to special relativity the rod's 
worldtube were not a real four-dimensional object, i.e. if also according to special 
relativity the rod or segment of A's travel path existed only at its present instant 
and therefore were a three-dimensional object (say, A's rod which is represented by 
the cross-section LA), no length contraction would be possible in special relativity – 
A's rod of length LA should be described as existing for B as well and B in turn 
should be depicted as measuring the same rod with the same length LA. Different 
relativistic describers should denote the same denotata. 
If also according to special relativity the rod existed only at its present 
instant, which would mean that such segment of A's travel path is depicted as an 
ontologically three-dimensional object (maybe retaining its identity as a three-
dimensional object in successive times), it would not exist entirely given in its past 
and future – namely, as a segment of a travel. Therefore, B's cross-section of 
length LB would lie in the rod's past and would not exist in the relativistic 
description. Neither A not B could be presented as intersecting it; intersection 
requires worldtubes. 
Uncollapsed, navigable, space-akin four-dimensionality is therefore what 
Kant would have called a condition of possibility: a requisite for relativity to depict 
that which observations encounter. As we shall see, this is why time is frame-
dependent in relativity, in whose descriptions the future is determinate; relativity 
harbors no alternative to the block universe view. 
5.4. Each observer measures different three-dimensional objects. Petkov 
remarks that, as it seems, "little attention has been paid to the fact that A and B do 
not measure the same three-dimensional rod". The rod or segment of A's travel 
path which B measures is a different three-dimensional object. This occurs as well 
in subuniverses in which causation matches the residual span of a collapsed time-
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dimension, as in the scenarios representing subuniverses where such a fourth 
dimension remains uncollapsed. 
Every observer ascertains if his or her own mental situation signals two 
extramental event (the two tips of the rod) occurring in distant space. Measuring 
spatial positions always involves semiosis, as we saw. Semioses are different for 
every observer: each is a separate act, enacted by a separate observing buildup, 
aiming to ascertain the possible extramental reference, of four different events 
sensed as the receptions of a pair of signals, to the rod's tips that suppossedly 
emitted these signals in an instant t0 which already is necessarily past, i.e. an 
instant which then left occasion to further intervening causal transformations, 
always local. This is clearly seen in Fig. 3 – at event M both A and B know that the 
rod exists 'for' each of them, but in special relativity's kinematic scenarios "this is 
only possible if there are two different three-dimensional cross-sections of the rod's 
worldtube, i.e. two different three-dimensional rods." [1, p. 11]. Not only in 
quantum physics, therefore, but also in special relativity what is observed depends 
in part on the observer. 
Same conclusion follows directly from relativity of simultaneity. The different 
parts of the rod or segment of A's travel path spatially extended over the sole three 
dimensions available constitute a set of events which exist simultaneously for A. As 
B has a different set of simultaneous events (the events constituting the 
worldtube's cross-section LB in the relativity's representation) it unavoidably follows 
that B measures a different three-dimensional rod or segment of A's travel path. In 
order that this be possible according to special relativity the rod's worldtube must 
be a real four-dimensional object. What does 'real' mean here? 
'Real' means that, when we say that according to special relativity A and B 
measure the same rod or segment of A's travel we refer to the worldtube of the rod 
or segment of A's travel path, but the observers regard different three-dimensional 
cross-section of the rod's worldtube as their rod or segment of A's travel, which 
means that they do measure different three-dimensional rods or segments of A's 
travel. Thus worldtubes are not only convenient graphical representations, but also 
extramental denotata in which observers can refer to different four-dimensional 
segments or 'slices'. As mentioned, measurement is a semiotic referral and its 
denotatum in each case is 'for' each of them: as Bains evoked from Aristotle, an 
instance of something pròs ti. 
5.5. Pervasive misconstruction of local contraction. Petkov mentions that the 
fact, that B measures a different three-dimensional rod, appears to rule out any 
explanation of the length contraction that involves deforming the rod or segment of 
A's travel path, i.e. any deformation efficiently caused by forces acting on the rod's 
or segment of path's 'atoms', "along the lines of the original Lorentz-FitzGerald 
proposal and what Bell [38] called 'Lorentzian pedagogy' (see also [39])." So the 
Babylonian caveat reveals to be still sound. The reason is that the deformation (or 
dynamical) explanation of the length contraction implies that A and B measure the 
same three-dimensional rod or segment of  travel, whereas relativity of 
simultaneity requires that A and B measure different three-dimensional rods or 
segments of travel – different denotata. 
It is useless to argument against a local contraction of present material rods, 
of course. While the misreading is rife (like the attribution of the twin pseudo-
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paradox to the 'constricting' effect of acceleration), in fighting it one feels sort of 
don Quixote beating windmills. According to special relativity the local observer 
(i.e., one saddling stationary the rod or segment of travel path) observes no 
change either in local space or along locally-measured intervals. Her 'rod', were the 
segment of travel path signaled by the present presence of some material, does not 
shrink and ebb under her legs. But the pervasiveness of this common mistake and 
the 'Lorentzian pedagogy' compels to accost it. Perhaps the most convincing 
argument that the 'Deformative explanation' of the length contraction is wrong, 
however, is that this explanation cannot account for the contraction of a material 
rod-pervading and rod-enveloping local space itself, where no macroscopic 
displaceable determinations nor specific forces exist that can cause its deformation. 
Yet the 'rod' or segment of A's travel path contracts. The muon experiment [40], 
e.g., cannot be explained if it is assumed that in relativistic scenarios space does 
not contract [41], nor the current developments a propos the evolution of the 
bodily system that furnishes minds with sensory contents [6, 42] and the 
neurobiophysical research on the observers' localization [6, 10, 32]. 
Length contraction and parallel time dilation can be formulated only in terms 
of the semioses-involving concept of distant present events (i.e. the concept of 
everything that exists simultaneously at the instant 'now': the unmeasurable 
present) even if – as might be seen on some non-inertial scenarios – the 
intervening distance is fairly short. The latter occur whenever the kinematic 
situation can be described as a strongly accelerated motion of relativistic magnitude 
(even a slight one) setting up what must be classically conceived as circular 
trajectories of microphysical radius (e.g. in the classical scenarios set by the fine 
structure constant α for the electron in a hydrogen atom), from which trajectories 
the outer intervals are dilated [6, 42]; or when the coupling with successive local 
states of a force field in some closed volume (say, the ~750 cm3 of brain grain of 
human observers) determines variations in the speed of another field's force 
carriers volumetrically interspersed with the force carriers of the former field: say, 
outer relativistic particles traversing, neutrino-like, all the way through the volume 
[3]. Inasmuch as dynamics makes a special subset of kinematics, these general 
relativity, energy-injection cases (i.e., microphysical circular trajectories, and 
coupling of a force field's action carriers with another force field's intensities across 
which the former traverse) just involve special cases of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald 
effects, expressed by the Valatin-Bogoljubov transforms. They demonstrate that no 
matter the magnitude of the involved distance, this concept, distant present 
events, is still used in special relativity when the existence of the physical objects 
involved in this relativistic effect is described in three-dimensional language. 
When A and B meet at M what everyone of them measures is what exists for 
(pròs) him – as Petkov also says [1, p. 11], 'his' present rod or segment of A's 
travel path, that is, all parts of the spatially extended three-dimensional rod or 
travel-path's segment which exist simultaneously at the instant 'now' of the 
observer. The travel segment or three-dimensional rod constitutes a set of distant 
present events and both observers must use its non-relativistic definition in order to 
talk about a three-dimensionally definable travel segment or 'rod' operationally 
locatable in an overlap of their semiotic referrals. A like situation occurs in the time 
dilation effect [35, chapter 5]. Yet in order to show that observers need not agree 
on which events are simultaneous those observers need to stand in relative motion, 
a translationality that precludes to occupy a single spacetime point, bringing in a 
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concept of 'distant present eventuation' that in special relativity cannot achieve 
meaning. Thereby kinematics demands dynamics: taken together with the fact that 
physical signals take time to enable semiosis, the very relativistic meaningless of 
distant present eventuation implies that according to sheerly kinematic special 
relativity nothing in nature escapes efficient causation; as Petkov observes, implies 
that according to special relativity nothing sheerly three-dimensional stands in the 
objective subuniverse. 
In the case of length contraction each of the observers A and B in Fig. 3 
measures a three-dimensionally definable travel segment or "rod", the respective 
denotatum, which is neither a purely subjective construct nor an extramental 
objective "thing in itself". What this description depicts is the travel segment's or 
rod's worldtube. Its semiotic or referential existence is deduced from the existence 
of length contraction – if the worldtube did not be referred to no length contraction 
would be possible to ascertain. 
5.6. The physical status of semiotic objects. A's and B's rods or segments of 
A's travel path – 'for' existences, denotata, tá pròs ti – are not extramental because 
the rod's or travel-path segment's worldtube is an indivisible four-dimensional 
entity. Despite its being referentially segmented (as distinguished from other 
segments of the travel path), it cannot be sliced into sheerly three-dimensional 
cross-sections. This occurs because Minkowski spacetime is not objectively 
dividable likewise. Thus the absolute, extramental rod or segment of A's travel path 
efficient to cause absolute (non-frame dependent) active or passive effects 
independently of its being observed is of course not the same as, or reductable to, 
its 'for'-existences in observers. 
These 'for'-existences are always molar or undecomposable below a certain 
macroscopic scale [6]; if sensed (rather than abstractly minded of) are always 
molarly intonated with sensations of the observer, semiotically referred to them; 
these 'for'-existences consist of or are constituted as parts of the observer ('mental 
contents'), defined in the general terms of the operations available in the observer's 
developmentally evolved system of operations [7, 33, 43, 44] and can feature only 
a predicative combination (concept) that leaves outside any idiosyncratic 
differences (and so, in case that an existentiality came to inhabit the rod or 
segment of travel path, cannot pinpoint his or her cadacualtez [2, 6]). Therefore 
the three-dimensional rod every observer measures according to special relativity is 
just a description of the rod's or travel-path segment's worldtube in terms of the 
ordinary three-dimensional language. 
Setting it up semiotically, or enacting its semiotic existence, is a condition of 
possibility for relativity, inasmuch as relativity is an interconversion descriptive tool 
for finite, located or circumstanced observers to reciprocally ascertain their 
respective perspectives. 
This situation, Petkov states [1, p. 12], "is analogous to the one that arises 
when the x – y planes of different coordinate systems 'cut' different two-
dimensional cross-sections of a cylinder – those sections are not real two-
dimensional objects since the cylinder itself is not objectively divided into different 
two-dimensional cross-sections." It does no matter that, as professor Mondolfo 
used to stress in private talks [Prof. Crocco, pers. comm.], Apolodorus probably 
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made some cones in remarkably thin gold sheets in order to gain precision for his 
studies on conic sections. 
 
Figure 4: Petkov [1, p. 12] refers to the figure above, on which the following should be noted. 
What observers A and B see each in his or her buildup is semiotically referred to the same 
cross-section L of the distant rod's worldtube. For distant elements, "same" means that, among 
the operatively ascertainable coincidences of the subuniverse descriptions by several observers, 
the referred-to object can be operatively identified as keeping the same relationships with the 
remaining coincident objects of their mental worlds, the adequacy of which worlds has 
developmentally been attaind by means of independent spontaneous probings [43, 44]. In 
general, when two observers A and B in relative motion meet at event M they see the past light 
cone – whose solid angle is constant because of the 'equivalence principle'. Note that the 
semiotically referred-to objects LA and LB are in the present, which of course rigorously (but 
exaggeratedly in the figure) stands outside of every circumstanced observer's lightcone. 
5.7. Inescapable retardation of embodied observers. Rigorously, it is not the 
case that we watch three-dimensional things and a three-dimensional subuniverse. 
It is seen in Fig. 4. Leaving aside neurobiological time-resolution constraints that 
impose present moments far larger than physical instants [6]; and leaving aside, 
too, the apprehension advance amount Á [3, § 1.3.13: "The apprehensional 
advance amount, Á", pp. 343-352] that the high-level, non-relativistic 'batch' 
neuroprocessing imposes on sensory data15, observers A and B, who are in relative 
motion, have different sets of simultaneous events and therefore different three-
dimensional subuniverses, but at event M they both see quite precisely the same 
thing – the past light cone. In the caption to Fig. 4 it is explained what 'same' does 
mean for an outer reality being semiotically referred to by more than one observer 
which developmentally attained a certain epistemological adequacy. However, 
                                                 
15 Reptiles (one may think of a bird; birds are archosaurian reptiles) in order to see perform sudden 
jerkings to the front with the whole head. Their brain and brainstem collate the initial and final 
'instantaneous' eye images of every jump, so as to form the three-dimensional scene. Yet those 
initial and final neurobiologically 'instantaneous' retinal images are in no way physically 
instantaneous. Each of them is a sensory batch formed along a physically sizeable interval, maybe 
over 1041 Planck instants long. Humans, which are synapsids and not reptiles, do nevertheless the 
same, but rather than whole-head joltings we perform the jerks with the eyeballs' positions in their 
sockets. We are blind during the eyeballs' jumping motions (called physiological nystagmus) that 
together add to about a half of our awake life. Similar sample integration processes are found in 
other senses. 
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because of light speed, this past is just quite recent. It in fact stays within the 
apprehension advance amount Á: 
"That is, one is always ahead of the times represented by one’s brain. 
This outdistancing is important to bear in mind. One’s advancement is 
a fairly appreciable fraction of a second, the said apprehension 
advance amount Á. It is the time taken by dissimilative 
neurodynamics to compose the brain state to which the circumstanced 
mind instantaneously reacts … differentiating the sensory experience 
of the 'current' moment. In other words, the apprehension advance 
amount Á is the time that the brain organ takes (through a complex 
articulation of microphysical causality) to dissimilate the latest 
ostensible (or manifest) physical contents which the therein-
circumstanced person is to (molarly) differentiate as diverse 
sensoperceptual mental contents at every moment." [3, p. 344] 
5.8 The overthrow of simultaneity. Paying due heed to these circumstances, 
we can start to explicitly address the question of existence and dimensionality of 
the objects ('fundamental particles', not-so-fundamental mesons, rulers, clocks, 
leave-taking twin organisms, etc.) and of the subjects (circumstanced observers) 
involved in the relativistic effects. Because of neurobiology, one would not say that 
our brains integrate the times of many instants to create an observed moment, but 
that brains dilate the time of an instant to create the observer's temporal modulus 
that we call moment – and, by regionally varying the dilation, put the sensory 
products into the attentional focus or, either, in disattention [6, 10]. Here it matters 
to remark that, also because of it, we know that efficient causation can be exerted 
across relativistic frames, as observer-brain interactions show.  
Efficient causation apt to be conveyed from one relativistic reference frame 
to another, across macroscopic ranges, is instanced of course by the nomic action 
of physical fields of force – segregated as modalities for interaction in our available 
range of energies – whose action carriers are not stopped by special circumstances 
such as acquiring inertial mass, as it rather is the case of gluons, and so have outer 
reference-frame time (locally do not enjoy time) to travel long distances before 
winking out of existence. Light is the most familiar of these massless carriers of the 
efficient causation whereby photons may signal their own emission event across 
relativistic frames. This physical aptitude makes semiosis 'transframable', i.e. 
amenable to relativistic transframing. 
Because of the observer's time acuity (which for sight encompasses several 
thousand kilometers at relativistic speeds, while in more astronomical situations the 
signals' delay of course exceeds our indefinition-adding, sizable apprehension 
advance amount Á), the points of the past light cones at M do not correspond to the 
same instant of the time of each of the observers. In particular, A and B have 
different three-dimensional rods or segments of A's travel path. But at every 
physical instant they could only properly denote the same three-dimensional cross-
section L which, however, cannot be regarded as a sheerly three-dimensional 
travel-path segment or rod – since all parts of a three-dimensional object exist 
simultaneously at one instant (the instant 'now'). 
The fulcrum of the whole analysis is that, by contrast, the parts of the three-
dimensional cross-section L correspond to different instants of the time of each 
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observer16. This is very important but also very well known, so that it often is 
simply skipped over. 
Yet it makes a condition of possibility in special relativity. Namely, figuring 
this situation in special relativity inescapably requires to figure that the parts of the 
three-dimensional cross-section L correspond to different instants of the time of 
each observer. It follows from here that it is not possible to interpret the length 
contraction in a sense that it is the same three-dimensional segment of A's travel 
path or 'rod' that 'exists for' A and B, but they could only see it differently. A's and 
B's semioses generate different denotata. 
The observers cannot measure the length of their respective A-travel-path 
segments or 'rods' at M. This is so since measurements take some time and as 
discussed each of the observers receives the signals and a fortiori perceives his A-
travel-path segment or 'rod' a little later, not at the instant when light signals left 
simultaneously the slightly different but always distant end points of the A-travel-
path's segment. But if the observers take into account these delays, they arrive at 
the conclusion that at the event M they had sensory reference to different sets of 
simultaneous events and therefore different three-dimensional A-travel-path's 
segments or 'rods'.  
So, the fact that body and often parts of the surroundings interpose in such 
a way that observers' experience are not usually in an immediate causal interaction 
with what they measure does not affect the conclusion that A and B have different 
three-dimensional A-travel-path's segments or 'rods'. Whence on a purely three-
dimensional presentist view and on the other hand neglecting that observers 
perdure outside of time courses, the length contraction effect is impossible. On a 
purely presentist view scenifying a subuniverse of null time-like thickness, i.e. 
lacking any intervalic extension of actuality whatsoever, no observer exists for – or 
could undergo – these semiosis-dependent effects. 
This properly shows how the peculiar dependence of relativistic descriptions, 
on the possibility of assuming a space-akin, navigable time-dimension, does its job. 
Although the fact that A's and B's semioses must of need refer to different three-
dimensional rods – whereas the referred-to rod stays locally invariant so as to 
efficiently cause invariant effects – is a direct consequence of relativity of 
simultaneity, it is worth to consider a thought experiment in which the 
measurement of the rod's length is instantaneous in A's and B's reference frames. 
By its assumed being instantaneous, such a measurement escapes light cone and 
this is where the Gedankenexperiment's importance lies. 
5.9. Proof two: simultaneous presence of converging outcomes from distant 
sequential events. This thought experiment, presented in comparable forms by 
Steven Hales and Timothy Johnson [45] as well as by Petkov [1, 35], will also 
                                                 
16 The fact that the subjective-time's graining (divided in moments, not in instants) is too much coarse 
for detecting any relativistic effect while scanning the surrounding, ordinarily-perceivable events, 
and that what we thus see are images which cannot be directly interpreted to represent three-
dimensional objects (for which they require apperception), is itself another indication bolstering the 
PPPPPP injunction that our senses cannot be fully trusted especially when it comes to such 
fundamental questions as the dimensionality of our subuniverse. In the contemporary research of 
observer-brain relationships (summarized, e.g., in [3]), however, the hackneyed contrast of sense 
and intellection has become greatly undermined. 
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provide additional arguments supporting the claim that the three-dimensionalist 
view contradicts the experiments which confirmed the kinematic relativistic effects 
– which effects, as a matter of fact, do occur in a nature with observers who by 
means of efficient interactivity develop mental worlds apt to contrast being and 
possibilities. 
 
Figure 5 a: Simultaneizing outcomes from distant sequences. Hales and Johnson's schema in 
"Endurantism, perdurantism and special relativity" [Ref. 45, p. 536], reproduced with permission 
from The Philosophical Quarterly. Hales and Johnson comment: "This seems to drive a stake 
through the heart of presentism: if t1 is now, and t2 is not now, that things at ‘not now’ can co-exist 
with things at ‘now’ seems to indicate that things at other times are certainly real. But it poses just as 
serious a problem for the endurantist. …The object does not have all of its parts present at one time." 
 
Figure 5 b: simultaneizing outcomes from distant sequences. Petkov's schema as provided in its 
Internet publication [Ref. 1]. Observers A and B, who are in relative motion, meet at event M. A 
rod – namely, a small piece of the path – moving on with A and pointing in the direction of 
motion, i.e. at rest in A's reference frame, has lights mounted on its two end points and on its 
middle point. In A's frame all lights of the rod were simultaneously green an instant before the 
meeting with B; they are all red at the instant of the meeting, and their color changes 
simultaneously to blue for A an instant after the meeting. Each of A and B determines the rod's 
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length instantaneously in his frame by taking snapshots of the rod's end and middle points with 
cameras placed at different points on A's x axis and on B's x axis along which the rod moves. 
The rod which B measures is present and consists of parts of A's past rod (with the green light), 
present rod (with the red light), and future rod (with the blue light). 
This pretended scenario differs, from the trivial case in which letters posted 
at diverse date arrive and cause their effects together, in that the very posting is 
sequential for the dispatcher but simultaneous for the receiver. Let the small piece 
of the path, i.e. the rod, again be at rest in A's reference frame (Petkov), analogous 
to the train's rest frame (Hales and Johnson). I will refer to the rod; while on the 
train the marking events are detonations, there are lights mounted on the end and 
middle points of such moving segment of A's travel path or 'rod'. In A's reference 
frame the color of the lights changes simultaneously every instant. As this has no 
physical meaning, whether in a sheerly three-dimensional subuniverse at all 
deprived of intervalic thickness or in a block universe whose uncollapsed fourth 
dimension is physically undemarcable, and as we do ignore which is "the ultimate 
modulus of [possible] transformational change, namely the minimal interval over 
which a causal transformation is at all possible or might be marked off by two 
different instants" [6], I will take it to mean that the color of the flashes changes 
every Planck instant. (No energy bill for creating such unforetold avalanche of 
visible-light photons: remember, this is a Gedankenexperiment; otherwise each of 
these physical transitions takes not 'an instant' but more than 1019 Planck instants, 
namely what takes traveling the size of a full hydrogen nucleus at the speed of 
light, in order to occur, not to mention to be recorded). 
Specifically, one instant before the meeting of A and B, for resting or local 
observer A all three lights on the fixed segment of her travel path or 'rod' flash 
green. To be a bit more precise: while standing apart on some physico-chemical 
structure of the rod, every one of the three signaling atoms underwent an 
electronic transition whereby one of its electrons is now emitting a photon carrying 
physical action to closely enact, through its future absorption, a well-specified 
distant change, i.e. the photon oscillates with a wavelength determined somewhere 
between, say, 500 and 550 nm. These three green emissions take place at the 
instant tgA.  
Next instant, that is at the very instant of the meeting t MA = t rA ,  for the 
resting or local observer A the three lights are red (the photon-yielding transitions 
have been smaller, so every one of the three signaling atoms of the rod emits a 
photon of greater wavelength, between say 650 and 680 nm) and one instant after 
the meeting the three lights are blue at t bA (larger electronic transitions caused 
every signaling atom to emit a photon of shorter wavelength: between, say, 440 
and 470 nm).  
At each of the three mentioned instants, therefore, the three emitted 
photons start oscillating  ('are created') carrying across space the respective 
amount of physical action ('energy'), without being able of being observed in travel 
(observation would absorb or annihilate the action carrier) or of modifying in travel 
the amount of physical action. First a volley of three green photons left the rod, one 
instant later a volley of three red photons departed, another instant later a volley of 
three blue photons did leave. They are assumed (not absorbed, not observed!) by 
local observer A to carry the mentioned energies, labeled as mentioned: first green, 
then red, then blue.  
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Let us introduce B, hastily approaching the meeting zone. At a distance, B 
moves relativistically; B not either could verify each photon's energy without 
absorbing (annihilating) it. Only one of the two observers, therefore, either the 
local or the remote but not both of them, enjoys the possibility of empirically 
ascertaining how much physical action in on each photon – so as to insert the 
empirical datum ('color') in his or her semiotic process. 
As seen in Fig. 5b, A and B move along their crossing x axes and, being a 
segment of A's travel path, A's rod is positioned parallel to A's x axis. Both A and B 
are assumed to use some magic instantaneous detectors, nevertheless called 
'cameras', at different points of their x axes. All cameras have clocks which have 
been synchronized in advance in each frame by using the Einstein's rule assuming 
that the back (some photons) and forth (other photons, created at best after time-
consuming characteristic processes) velocity of light in A's and B's frame is the 
same. The cameras have been 'synchronized' in such a way that all clocks in each 
frame show zero for a long time, all along the event of the meeting M – say, for a 
millionth of a hundredth of a second if the berth of the relativistic-speed meeting is 
3 m. This is about 1035 Planck instants, i.e. ~1016 times longer than the time 
needed for interactions of this species to become determined (though their effect, 
in order to be enacted, would still demand much more time than that, depending on 
the absorbing system). But as mentioned, observers are not pointlike, and for a 
Gedankenexperiment it is needlessly cumbersome to assume that certain 
occurrences are unrealistically nontemporal or instantaneous and also the meeting 
space is unrealistically inespatial. Hales and Johnson introduce a railway station, yet 
the encounter's scale is not set up by its platform's length but by the meeting berth 
allowed by the setting's time resolution. Though Petkov does not consider it, let it 
thus take place on a scale of some 3 m  
This of course leaves speed indeterminate, but the inertial mass, of the 
physical system circumstancing the observers to interact, legitimates one for 
assuming the speed's magnitude continuous with its values at the previous and 
ensuing states.17 When A and B meet at M-zone during the interval of ~1035 Planck 
instants along which the clocks show t M A = 0 of A's time and at t M B = 0 of B's 
time, A and B determine the length of the small segment of A's travel path or 'rod' 
instantaneously in their reference frames by taking camera snapshots of its distant 
end and middle points. Each snapshot captures the three photons, recording their 
effects; A's camera is hanging elevated so it captures the rod's three lights from the 
same distance that passerby B does at the latter closest approach, from a slightly 
different angle. Some time after the meeting A and B respectively collect the single 
middle picture from each of their three sets of snapshots to see the results of their 
experiments – and assume that both quasi-local observations (the middle picture in 
the two sets, A's and B's) date from almost the same, almost locally-shared instant. 
They know that it could not be the same instant. Namely, the two observers 
cannot have detected the same photons, i.e. the trio emitted by the 'rod' at some 
given instant, because every photon can only be detected once – turning whatever 
extramental causal deed unobservable, as Crocco showed. Not either could they 
have achieved the purpose by entangling some subsets of the photons' set, 
whether along the 'rod' or across the observers, because entangled observables 
                                                 
17  This may certainly be controverted at the Planck scale. 
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vanish when the correlate does its causal work. They then try to introduce 
probabilities in special relativity but find that the probability that B identifies which 
was the recorded instant of A requires unmanageable combinatorics of a far greater 
number of colors. Nevertheless, for A the three colors were simultaneously the 
same. Would the colors differ on the B's set middle picture? 
Observer A sees that the three dots of light (each showing the middle and 
the two end points of the rod) of the sequence's middle picture, timed t M A = ~0, 
display the same color: red, red, and red. The immediately previous and ensuing 
pictures are also timed t M A = ~0 but show green, green and green; blue, blue, 
blue: always the same colors. Light signals did carry the physical action which was 
furnished by their origination in an electronic transition of those precise 
magnitudes. Observer B also sees that the three pictures show the same uncertain 
time t M B = ~0, but because figuring this situation inescapably requires to figure 
that the parts of the three-dimensional cross-section L correspond to different 
instants of the time of each observer, we must figure that the colors in B's three 
pictures are green, red, and blue. 
We? Yes indeed; Gedankenexperimenten say also something about the 
subject: the three colors is what we should figure that B observes. Wavelengths of 
the photons emitted at the rod's ends may have shifted, or not; we must figure 
that they did. We cannot dodge it. It is condition of possibility for us to make 
relativistic portrayals. Hales and Johnson cannot elude suppossing that their station 
onlooker observes the simultaneous state of the passenger in the train at once with 
his past at the front and and future at the rear of the speedy train, so that they 
exclaim, "Clearly the train does not exist 'all at one time' ". Is this a simultaneizing 
of past, present, and future perduring realities, or either a Doppler effect in efficient 
causation-acknowledging, collapsed fourth-dimension subuniverse?  
5.10. Discussion of Proof two (Gedankenexperiment). Condition of possibility 
for having relativistic descriptions is that the later account becomes presented as 
the former. But let us consider this conflation in some detail. Let me add the 
unsustainable supposition that also M takes no more than a single instant (in this 
case observers should be some 1035 times faster than light and it would hugely 
diminish [2] dilations and contractions, but the question still makes sense) and now 
ask what exists for A and B at M. As at the instant of the meeting all three red 
lights of the moving segment of A's travel path or 'rod' are simultaneous for A at 
his present instant t M A = t r A , what exists for him at M is the all-red segment which 
lies in A's present. The green segment existed for A one instant before the meeting 
and is in his past while the blue segment will exist one instant after the meeting and 
is in his future. According to the presentist views the green and blue rods do not 
exist for A at t M A = t r A since they belong to A's past and future, respectively. 
The fact that at M in B's present lies a three-dimensional moving segment of 
A's travel path whose front end point, middle point, and rear end point are green, 
red, and blue, respectively (B is moving to the left in Fig. 5) means that in 
relativistic descriptions the green–red–blue A's travel-path's segment, which is 
present for B, consists of part of A's past travel-path's segment (the front end point 
with green light), part of A's present travel-path's segment (the middle part of the 
rod, which is also present and therefore exists for A at the instant of the meeting), 
and part of A's future travel-path's segment (the rear end point with blue light). As 
all parts of an spatially extended, three-dimensional referred-to travel-path's 
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segment exist simultaneously at the present instant of an observer, the three-
dimensional rod that exists for B at his present instant t M B is different from the 
three-dimensional rod of A existing at his present instant t M A = t r A . (The interval 
or, in the last scenario, event of the meeting M in Fig. 5 is the only common 
present event for both observers.) The same thing is not present for both 
observers. 
The rod – small piece of A's path – referred to by each observer is composed 
of a mixture of parts of the past, present, and future rods of the other observer and 
in relativistic descriptions, to repeat Hales' and Johnson's words, "every object has 
proper parts at different times," "hence no object wholly exists at each moment of 
its existence". Why does this occur? 
 Relativity is an interconversion procedure aimed to ascertain what the 
perspectives can refer to; not what exists outside of perspectiveness. This is why 
relativity cannot do justice to non-perspectival absoluteness, except precisely in 
what such absoluteness imposes without admitting mimesis or anamorphosis [3]: 
i.e., the cancellation of non-being and causal detemination of every event as 
unmodifiably being earlier than some and later than some of the other events.  
Therefore, if any doubt subsisted, the conclusion that in relativistic 
descriptions each of the observers A and B measures a different three-dimensional 
rod is indeed inevitable and comes from the different simultaneizing with which 
each perspective offer its object. Petkov says that the eventual performance of 
anything resembling this specific experiment would allow A and B to arrive at the 
idea of the rod's worldtube even if they never heard of Minkowski. He points out 
that  
"the observers A and B might fairly judge that the only way to 
explain their pictures is to assume that the rod they measured exists 
equally (at once) at all instants of its history in time. Their reason is that 
the experiment directly confirmed this conclusion: parts of the rod's 
past, present, and future (which are also A's past, present, and future 
since the rod is at rest in A's frame) exist simultaneously as B's present 
rod. A's present rod also contains parts of B's past, present, and future 
rod. This would not be possible if the rod did not exist equally in its past, 
present, and future.18 Therefore A and B might conclude that their 
experiment has a profound physical meaning."  
Indeed, things are so. It proves that relativistic descriptions demand to 
consider that all physical objects are extended in time, which means that in 
relativistic descriptions they are uncollapsedly19 four-dimensional. 
                                                 
18 Petkov observes that the experiment depicted in Fig. 5 deals only with the immediate past and future 
of the rod, but [at least before one really calculates the Doppler effects on the signals for every 
segment of their travel and the spatial extension ('size') of the meeting event and where their limits 
fall (i.e., where their light cones cease to overlap) M.S.], one can add other observers that also 
meet A at M but their velocities relative to A are greater than B's velocity. The present rods of these 
observers will contain what relativistically must be described as parts of more distant past and 
future of A's rod. 
19  Special relativity lacks means to set limits to the fourth dimension's magnitude. 
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One might note that this condition of possibility differs from the need of 
considering realistic, not pointlike observers, meeting, railways and flashes. The 
latter need imposes itself in order to obtain a realistic physical scenario so as to 
ponder on in philosophy of science, but definitely most practical applications of 
special relativity will continue paying no attention to it, like in general relativity 
many calculations directly apply the forces on the bodies' center. But the former 
differs, as it is a condition of posibility, not a condition of accuracy: one could not 
neglect such a condition of possibility because it is necessary in order to define the 
considered scenario as relativistic. 
It is not the first occasion in physics that a defining condition, or directly a 
definition, is utilized to furnish a hypothesis (the uncollapsed fourth dimension, in 
this case) which is necessary to create the scenario where calculations may 
advance. Boltzmann, e.g., introduced molecular disorder as the condition that 
molecules must satisfy in order to make feasible one of the steps in his derivation 
of the collision rate among gas molecules; Planck likewise defined natural radiation 
by means of a mathematical condition that the field's Fourier components must 
satisfy in order to allow the derivation of his theorem of H; Minkowski four-
dimensionality with uncollapsed fourth-dimension, likewise, works as a condition 
allowing to build relativistic scenarios. 
Validity of special relativity can be thus considered a definition of the 
statement '"events occur in uncollapsed, navigable dimensions". Or, to say the 
same more historicistically: in order to refrain from introducing efficient causation 
in describing transformative sequences, time is to be presented as a navigable 
dimension. 
A and B might further believe they can claim that a single experiment, which 
allowed a single interpretation, proved the uncollapsed four-dimensionality of the 
subuniverse, entailing that things indeed are as PPPPPP's needs. Yet not everything 
seems entirely plain. Erstwhile this further belief might have been contested from 
the very PPPPPP's side: a philosopher of science rigorously adhering to 
subjectivisms or phenomenisms would have immediately disagreed. He would have 
pointed out that the claim is based on an implicit ontological assumption – that the 
existence of the physical objects is absolute, i.e. observer or frame-independent 
inasmuch as resulting from transformations enacted by frame-invariant efficient 
causation. Nowadays, as the reality of the latter is now recognized (§ 1.5) from the 
empirically ascertained need of sequential interactivity – wherein the mind-
originated probings enact absolute motion – to acquire befitting knowledge of 
extramental occurrences, denying the absolute existence of products of such 
absolute causation is no longer tenable. Since this claim is deduced from 
experiments no other ontological assumptions seem to be needed.2046Still an 
                                                 
20 Xenochronic observers peep into time courses through different spatial volumes, i.e. parcels of nature 
of different extension. While the gray tissue in the brain of adult snake Leptotyphlops emini is less 
than two cubic millimeters, adult mice brain gray is less than one cubic centimeter, adult human's 
some 700 cm3 and adult sperm-whale's reach around 4000 cm3 [45]. Imagine that two inertial 
observers A and B and an accelerated observer C peep into time courses through physiological 
arrangements that may be accommodated within the meeting volume and meet at M (but A's frame 
is not C's comoving inertial reference frame at M). C's present rod will again be relativistically 
presented as a mixture of A's past, present, and future rod and the conclusion that the rod's 
worldtube must exist as something pròs ti follows. B and C will have the same contracted rod that 
consists of parts of A's past, present, and future rod. 
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inauspicious ambiguity, if in the loom, may however cast its dimness on the further 
belief, as the speed that any observed clock appears to run depends on whether it 
is traveling away from or toward the observer. Why? Even before performing the 
conscientious Doppler analysis of the experiment's signals commented in what 
follows, a philosopher of science will pinpoint two putative interpretations: 
(i) if extramental existence is absolute, the simultaneous existence of parts 
of A's past, present, and future rod as B's present rod (and vice versa) does lead to 
the conclusion that either the light signals' redshifting and blueshifting accounts for 
the result or the rod must exist equally at all instants of its history;  
(ii) if existence is relative (observer- or frame-dependent), each observer 
will claim that it is only his three-dimensional referred-to rod that exists – an option 
to be discarded on the reasons indicated in §§ 1.5 and 2.4, as well as the just 
mentioned fact that relativity is a tool to interconvert perspectives, lacking means 
to probe what exists outside of perspectiveness. 
At the articulation in which Kant, after his transcendental deduction of the 
categories, refrained from affirming that he was portraying the 'noumenon', A and 
B are convinced that it is only the experiment that decides whether the subuniverse 
is three- or four-dimensional. Of course, facing the effective results of the 
experiment, they agree that, formally, 'existence' in special relativity can be 
regarded as relativized (namely, posited as relative to some reference frame, 
coordinate system or observer, and so made relativistically meaningful) by the 
simple recourse of referring relativistic descriptions to denotata. But can their 
further belief agree to viewing 'to be' as 'to be denoted'? A and B realize that such 
an assumption preserves the three-dimensionality of the special relativity's 
description of the subuniverse, but it is an alternative option to the conclusion of a 
four-dimensional subuniverse only in the case of the reciprocal length contraction 
and time dilation which are based on relativity of simultaneity. That is why A and B, 
like Petkov and us now, concentrate their attention on the twin paradox. Petkov [1, 
p. 17] explains:"As it is an absolute, not a reciprocal effect, no relativity of 
simultaneity is involved in its explanation and therefore the relativization of 
existence should not be an alternative explanation. … the derivation and the 
explanation of the twin 'paradox' (Fig. 6) are based on the triangle inequality in the 
pseudo-Euclidean geometry of spacetime which presupposes the existence of the 
twins's world-lines (in order to be able to talk about a triangle in spacetime)." 
5.11. Proof three: the twin paradox. Careful ascertaining of how long it takes 
light to travel in-between explains the supposed paradox, its directional constraint, 
and even alterations in the signals' power to cause effects (redshifting) as they 
approach lightcones [47]. Petkov observes that the relativistic explanation of the 
twin paradox is in the framework of the four-dimensionalist view, and summarizes 
a long literature by pointing out that "the length of twin B's worldline between the 
event of the departure D and the event of the meeting M is shorter than the length 
of twin A's worldline between the same events (in Fig. 6 twin B's worldline is longer 
but this is caused by the representation of a pseudo-Euclidean relation on the 
Euclidean surface of the page). This means that B measures less time between D 
and M than his brother." 
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Figure 6, from [1], p. 17. Twins A and B are represented by their worldlines. At the event of 
departure D twin B starts a journey at a speed that is close to the speed of light. At event T he 
turns back and meets his brother at event M. As it now is fairly divulged [48, 49, 50, 51], with 
careful use of the time it takes light to travel between the two the pseudo-paradox gets 
elucidated. 
In view of that, Petkov says, "the only way for the twins to explain the five-
year difference of their clocks' readings at M is to assume that twin B's time has 
slown down. But this is precisely the problem for the three-dimensionalists – the 
rate of the proper time does not change according to special relativity (proper time 
is an invariant) which means that when A and B meet at M their clocks should show 
the same time." Yet special relativity is valid only in a four-dimensional subuniverse 
represented by Minkowski spacetime and meticulous relativistic descriptions [47, 
48, 49, 50, 51] clearly demonstrate why twins differ. 
5.12. Proof three: discussing the twin 'paradox'. In contrast, the sheerly 
three-dimensional view of relativized existence by its need of untenably resorting to 
acceleration contradicts the now plain experiments that confirm the twin paradox. 
(Petkov develops the point in [35, Chap. 5].) But the acceleration to which B is 
subjected has been ruled out as cause [52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. Hence the three-
dimensionalist view resorting to acceleration cannot explain why twin B is younger 
which means that this view cannot as well explain the twin 'paradox'21. 
While no scientific tool is non-theoretical, in the current scientific context 
that concurrently finds the transframing of efficient causation and causal initiatives 
as requisite for epistemological accuracy, the interpretation of the experiments 
                                                 
21 Petkov wrote, "It may appear inviting to "explain" the different readings of the twins' clocks by 
saying that time is frame-dependent in relativity. However, this is not an explanation at all since the 
very question is: Why, [if causation is frame-invariant and its absolute products are given just once 
at a time, yet] is time frame-dependent in relativity?" (Square brackets mine). As at this point it 
should be surfacing, answer is: because relativistic calculations ought to spatialize time, or, four-
dimensionality is a condition of possibility for relativistic descriptions – legitimately applicable to 
phenomena, but whose use for noumena is incorrect, to put it in Kant's expressions. 
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which confirm this theoretical result has a say regarding the aptitude of the 
relativity's conditions of possibility to also detect the dimensionality of the 
subuniverse. We only know that this procedure for interconverting the perspectives 
of localized observers, namely relativity, must inescapably assert that we live in a 
four-dimensional block universe in which the whole histories of all objects are 
realized in their worldtubes. Even when quantum theorists such as Myrvold seek a 
"collapse theory that is genuinely, metaphysically compatible with special relativity" 
[57] understand it "in the sense of depicting the world as ‘unfolding within a four-
dimensional Minkowski space-time’, to use Albert’s [58: Myrvold's note] picturesque 
phrase." Special relativity depends on a condition of possibility that a priori decides 
the issue of the dimensionality of its descriptions of the subuniverse at the 
macroscopic level. Could this situation be used to learn anything about any other 
reality besides the relativistic calculations themselves? 
 
6 Different Descriptions Versus Different Ontologies 
Harrington recently [59] wrote: "Gödel argued that absence of global time in 
relativistic space-time is sufficient to disprove the existence of time itself. Gödel 
thus became the first, as far as I am aware, but not the last thinker to claim that 
relativity theory solves all philosophical problems about time by dissolving them." 
Without going so much far, the depicted situation may indeed help to rule out 
three-dimensionality. As Petkov says, not only would the kinematic relativistic 
effects be impossible if the subuniverse were three-dimensional, but the 
experimental evidence which confirms them would not be possible either. This 
seems serious. Without relativity of simultaneity there could not be equivalence of 
mass and energy, thus there would be no limit under which their conservation has 
a break, thus action quanta could not set correlated limits for their determination, 
thus there would be no virtual particles, thus no physical forces, thus no particles 
could be held together, chemistry would not exist, without chemistry there would 
be no biology, and without biology there would be no way for action-initiating 
minds to interactively attain intellectual development [10] – so without relativity of 
simultaneity any present reader should be able to verify that he or she is an angel 
with infuse knowledge.  
One should consequently conclude that any effort and money spent in one's 
education was a miserable failure (authors might also use the Acknowledgements 
section to deprecate their teachers) or recognize that deeming actuality sheerly 
three-dimensional challenges genetic epistemology, defying our shared 
developmental experience. Nevertheless, were relativistic calculations performed on 
three-dimensional assumptions, "any experiments designed to test the three 
relativistic effects we discussed – relativity of simultaneity, length contraction, and 
the twin [pseudo-]paradox – would detect absolute simultaneity, no length 
contraction, and no time difference in the twins' clocks' readings", so that the 
present cannot be of null time-like thickness or interval-like infinitesimal. One thus 
may find oneself legitimated for rejecting the three-dimensional ontology; yet, not 
because relativity alone says it, or because the three-dimensional ontology differs 
from the ontological assumptions which are to be posed in order to make relativity 
operational; but, rather, because relativity can be integrated with other 
contemporary insights from diverse fields, some of which such as neurobiology, 
genetic epistemology, and history of ideas I commented above. In such a company, 
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relativistic calculations work fine for interconverting perspectives. Can we go 
beyond it? Petkov explores if it is true "that relativistic mechanics does not carry a 
particular ontological interpretation upon its sleeve", as Balashow says [60], finding 
that relativity can operate on a sine qua non condition which does contain just one 
ontology – the uncollapsed four-dimensional ontology – which is deducible from 
those effects. Kant rather warns us that conditions of possibility do not yield any 
accurate knowledge whatsoever about what stays beyond their molding aptitude. 
Could we ascertain, upon any insight coming from this situation, if the macroworld's 
fourth dimension stands uncollapsed or, instead, time dimension collapsed in 
magnitude so as to match the efficient causation features? 
My current answer is negative and negatively grounded. I do not see how to 
jump, from the legitimate use of an uncollapsed fourth dimension in relativistic 
calculations aimed to interconvert perspectives, to agreeing or disagreeing with the 
coherent articulation of seemingly well-validated knowledges from other academic 
fields providing support to the view that nature is an efficiently transforming reality, 
in which transformations flow with a pace set by causation's features and changes 
are irrevocable, things existing only a timelike instant each time, so that, e.g., the 
present now is the same that any one of Precambrian times transformed. A nature, 
in sum, in which the rate of time flow or transformations' 'pace' should be ascribed 
to causation's inner features that are, themselves, tantamount to spreading action 
on a fourth dimension whose span collapsed into a present-now's timelike 
"thickness" which precisely allows causation to enact change. 
 
Conclusions 
Because what Minkowski came across is a Kantian condition of possibility for 
relativity, time in relativity is frame-dependent, in its descriptions future is 
determinate, and relativity harbors no alternative to the block universe view. It 
implies that special relativity is valid only in a four-dimensional world represented 
by Minkowski spacetime. Yet no grounds are in view to assume that special 
relativity alone be able to provide a definite proof of the block universe view, save 
that one has previously refused to recognize reality to efficient causation, both to 
nomical ("nature's") causation and personal ("conation" or "will") causation, as well 
as to any residual, time-like thickness of reality that could match the action 
requirements of such efficient causation enabling it to set real transformative 
courses. This Platonist view is found associated with an anthropology serving 
certain interests (presenting people as robots) which, by their being ideological61, 
fall outside of the scope of the present article. 
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Appendix 
Excerpta (taken with permission) from [2] § 1.3.24, pp. 388-392, "Intertwining 
agencies":  
"Willful remembering, moving limbs, or imagining a red tree are semovient acts of 
esemplastic attention. Is it possible to allow subjective terms into supraquantum 
physics, permitting it to make predictions about subjectivity? In these 
circumstances, the event of experience that terminates every chain of physical 
measurement cannot be artificially sundered from the plurality of other contents in 
the same experiencing mind. Which include, besides the measurement done in each 
case, also the findings of her own semovient action of attentional reclustering 
resisting itself (= cogito); finitude; circumstances; and availabilities. The latter may 
certainly include scientific notices, of the style of the ones in the preceding pages…. 
Therefore, the experiencing that terminates every chain of physical measurement 
cannot doubt that, within the specified stipulations of its object-system's 
macroscopic depiction of extramentalities and constitution of intramentalities, the 
notices she grasps about the extramental subuniverse —including foreign subjective 
terms— do resolve true facticities. By way of illustration: 
• that in every voluntary action, the incumbent finite psycheé experiences her own 
causative agency in the knitting of some extramental facts under her genuine 
control;  
• that the causal-linked relevancies eventuate and transfigurate apart from their 
empirical reflections (in whatever number of minds [that might] observ[e] them), 
and so they constitute a subset of real events under 'physical laws', mutually 
imposing regularities on empirical findings, in an impositional way analogous to 
each finite experiencing's own causative agency; 
• that microphysics holds reality beyond the [molar] graininess of the fictions 
useful to represent it; 
• that the causal series, begun by other parcels of experiencing finitude, ensue 
upon their anomic starting, which is extramental with respect to the aforesaid, 
observing finite psychism; 
• that past and future states not exist and are only anisotropically referenceable; 
and 
• that the physical reality comes into being just one instantaneous present 
situation at a time.  … 
[§§] Extramentalities not originate in any 'prejudice of the (external) world': All this 
furnishes a pre-ordered body of gradients and resistances, that the intramental 
action needs to operate and, on its different frustrations, learn adequately about 
the extramentality in the self-agential terms of what semoviences can do with their 
experiential encounters. "As the light dove that, in lively fly, feels the resistance of 
the air and might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space."22 This 
                                                 
22 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung nach Ausg. B, ss. 8-9: "Die leichte Taube, indem sie im 
freiem Fluge die Luft teilt, deren Widerstand sie fühlt, könnte die Vorstellung fassen, dass es ihr im 
luftleeren Raum noch viel besser gelingen werde". Kant immediately continues: It was thus that 
Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured 
out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. 
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'syntax', of this structural operation with mental contents, may be conceived as the 
building up of a further inner metrics, one added to the physical metrics whereby 
bruta animalia operantur ex passione, the added metrics being developmentally 
acquired by the mental spaces. I. e.: that of the logic-mathematical operations, 
those feasible and those resilient to conserve the element of interest; or, the 
operation reversibly positioning an object —say, an object referring to somebody— 
in a web of status or of kinfolk intimacy — say, as being such and such next-of-kin 
in some 'lineage': e. g., the nephew of an uncle and viceversa; a web of rules very 
variable amongst the cultures, for certain. This acquired metrics is not the 
dimensions: physically, mental spaces in no respect are Hilbert-like, that is to say 
moulded by a 'coordinate system' of all the object-defining features of the mental 
contents, but only by the structureless ones. These set constitutive geodesics; the 
acquired metrics just chisels operations, in a self-referred system of constrainments 
enacted to attain some operatory result ([2] p. 461). Amidst this acquired metrics, 
also sensoperceptual gradients for object positioning eventuate. 
The intramental action encounters all those gradients as a finely itemized, but 
systematic datum. And must account with them and with the discoverable body of 
those intrinsic stipulations, feasibilities, resiliences and resistances (whose detail 
and boundary or initial conditions are not to be analized now). Their picture is so 
consistent with the finite psycheé's observations and experiments; and these, in 
their cruciality, validate that finely detailed picture.  
Whence its description of nature is hylozoistic, since such body of stipulations 
includes the finding of foreign sources of actions absolutely starting new causal 
series upon experienced determinations. And freedom, as causation, cannot be 
predicatively shammed. 
In its contents, detected in the biospheric evolution, this hylozoistic spotting of the 
causal series determined at a selected subset of simultaneous historic states —a 
discretionary selection which lacks the integrality that would made it equivalent to 
Newtonian instantaneous causality, and evinces the subjective apprehension 
imperative in the physical fact of selecting a subset of antecedents for the own 
time-transformation— is the physics counterpart of the philosophical detection 
which our tradition technically labels as 'recognizing the alien cogito'. Both 
detections (or recognitions) make contemporary definitions of hylozoism. 
On such recognition of other experiencing sources of real actions, any difference 
vanishes between the finite experiencer's knowledge descriptive of this physical 
universe being 
(I) that of a screenplay 'movie', not wholly unlike a dream, intramentally projected 
(even, as a pattern of 'meanings' —assumed inherent or extraintentional— of a 
nature reduced to language for a discursive cerebral homunculus, bare of non-
simulational insight even of its own intonations and causation, to analyze; screens 
are instruments to predicationally tailor a posited reality whose unique change is 
alteration and where waitings are sheer hermeneusis);  
(II) and being that of true extramentalities. This allows subjective terms into 
supraquantum physics, permitting it to make predictions about the subjectivity of 
finite psychisms.  
The difference so vanishes, because upon simultaneous duration such description 
does drag, across sentience and unmindfulness, the reality previously recognized to 
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that absolute origin of new causal series aweigh as well of compulsion as of 
randomness. 
So, any such 'intramental movie' with all the sensory input and 'interactive' 
feedbacks (be it delivered by Cartesius' malign genius, by Leibniz' divine (Pseudo-
)Creator making the observer's and the observed's waveforms to collapse in line 
with the Vedantist function of a Universal Mind, or by a computer along wires 
plugged into the observer's substrate tissue) ought to be detailed enough as for 
every event to be local, and ought to be ticked in an operative time so as to really 
produce, from the lilliputian proportions of microphysics on, such outset of really 
new causal series. And so undergo causal transformation (= mutual deposition of 
the set of physical actions) with one same physical pace under due relativistic 
transforms, and including, in its interactivity, the intrinsic direction for its 
integration ('causal arrow'). 
If a cinematographic or videogame fictioneering, its totalness or literary sufficiency 
is thus anything but enough. It must also be one, which responds with well-nigh-
infinitesimal graininess of productive detail. So much detailed, that its contents do 
reciprocally chain causally. With the same univocal, productive and efficient 
causation which the experiencing experiences in operating with its objects or 
mental contents. A causation operated through said waitings that the released 
pendules and all other accelerations do comply with; around the impotency to 
activate neighbours' limbs and intentions; over all feasibilities, resiliences and 
disabilities for accomplishing movements with the available body and its 
accouterments, and their respective delays. All these are 'resistances', not posited 
by the own agency, whereto nonetheless one's feeling-driven behaviour must 
adjust itself to causally achieve operations onto its objects. In such a wise, that 
foreign freedoms and possible intentions enter all dynamic planning and handling to 
exercise one's causation, being intentioned jointly with the own feasible movements 
and delays of one's body and accouterments. Thus, this sort of imprisoning 
screenplay 'supernaturally projected into our soul' can no longer pass off the 
elapsing and the present as artifacts of subjective perspective. It ought then to 
include real novations: namely, other experiencing sources of real novative actions, 
finite inceptors. 
This requisite graining fractures the 'gnoseocapsule'. Turning one's attention inward 
and minding about what is going on in one's own mens is unstable, and gets ahold 
of time-arrowed extramentalities. Experience is found to occur at a plurality of 
extramental dates and sites. 
So the empsyched reality self-adaptively knows of itself truthfully, if scantily, by 
evolutionarily seeping into object systems some true notices of its events and 
constitution and even imposing inflections on its available preferences. Truly 
causating both fictitious and roughly-adequate causal accounts, and actions in 
extramentality feed-backing on such notices. Psychaí have knowledge necessarily 
through sensible perception. They know immediately parts of the reality, without 
any mediating representation whatsoever; and those parts are installed and 
interact with the remaining alterities of nature through a unique, shared causality. 
Extramentalities do not originate in any 'prejudice of the (external) world', as 
Merleau-Ponty academically charged (but mass-culture turns unacademically 
repetitious), wishing to dismiss the eclosional finitude of animal psychisms by way 
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of what today should be called 'to present every life as a role, played in a full-brain 
videogame by some transcendental commiscuum'. And, against what Kant charged 
in KrV B 303, ontology, feasible upon the cogito of the own circumstanced finitude, 
also becomes possible of its embedding extramentality. 
Freedom cannot be shammed. Thus, the stipulations of these object systems to 
assemble fictions representative of extramental happenings (i. e., the fictions' blunt 
resolution, or incompleteness down even to emblematicity, as that of mere tokens; 
and absence of causal efficacy in the represented line of processes) cannot be 
forced into criterion of reality. On this basis, or by that principle, finite semovient 
observers are enabled to adequately infer the ontic occurrence of extramental 
events, from their experiences of those events." 
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